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UNITARY INNOVATIONS AND POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
Edward H. Stiglitz†
An important trend in administrative and constitutional law is to at-
tempt to concentrate ever-greater control over the administrative state in the
hands of the President.  As the Supreme Court recently reminded us in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
one foundation for this doctrinal trend is a fear that diffusing power diffuses
accountability.  Here, I study whether institutional innovations resulting
from such judicial decisions support this functionalist constitutional value
of political accountability, emphasizing under-appreciated complications
arising out of interbranch relations.  For most of the Article, I conduct an in-
depth empirical case study of the legislative veto, one of the legislature’s more
potent tools to control the administrative state.  I focus in particular on les-
sons we can draw from the “laboratories” of the states.  Using a novel dataset
of state session laws, I demonstrate that legislatures respond to a judicial
invalidation of the legislative veto by augmenting alternative tools of admin-
istrative control.  I further show that after the loss of the legislative veto,
control over administrative agencies seemingly shifted in favor of the legisla-
ture, not the executive—an outcome contrary to the expectations of a unitary
executive theorist but consistent with a legislative “backlash” to the judicial
decision.  These findings question a foundation of the unitary impulse pre-
sent in much recent judicial doctrine and advocate a dynamic perspective in
separation of powers doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this: that in any
business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, some-
body must be trusted, in order that when things go wrong it may be
quite plain who should be punished. . . . Power and strict accountabil-
ity for its use are the essential constituents of good government.
–Woodrow Wilson1
“[O]ne of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the execu-
tive,” Alexander Hamilton famously explained, “is that it tends to con-
ceal faults and destroy responsibility.”2  This reasoning helped defeat
proposals for a plural executive during the Federal Convention.3  As
the Supreme Court recently reminded us,4 it also represents a pillar
supporting much of modern administrative law and, more generally,
the theory of the “unitary executive,” which advocates for the concen-
tration of administrative powers in the hands of the President.5
1 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
186–87 (1956).  This quote is particularly noteworthy because it was used by Justice John
Paul Stevens to motivate, in part, his concurrence in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 738 n.1
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
As with the quote from Woodrow Wilson, jurists have appealed to this quote when advanc-
ing arguments in favor of a unitary executive. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he President is directly dependent on the
people, and since there is only one President, he is responsible,” and quoting Hamilton in
support).
3 See 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65
(1986) (quoting John Rutledge as saying that “[a] single man would feel the greatest re-
sponsibility and administer the public affairs best”).
4 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155
(2010) (quoting in part from Hamilton and observing that “[t]he diffusion of power car-
ries with it a diffusion of accountability” and “[w]ithout a clear and effective chain of com-
mand, the public cannot determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a
pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
5 See infra Parts I, II.  For formulations to this effect, see, for example, Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42 (1995)
(stating that plurality in the executive increases the difficulty of both detecting policy er-
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Though the Convention opted against a plural executive, questions
have persisted throughout the republic’s history about the extent to
which we wish to fully realize the vision of a unitary executive.6
The prevailing judicial and academic perspective favors doctrines
supporting a more unitary executive.7  Over the last three decades,
the Supreme Court has gradually stripped away a variety of institu-
tional devices designed to encourage congressional control or bureau-
cratic autonomy.8  Developments with respect to interpretive
doctrines, similarly, concentrate control in the President, granting the
Executive ever-greater discretion when implementing statutes.9
Though not without dissent,10 scholars, likewise, often align with the
Court, arguing for doctrines promoting the unitary executive on the
grounds of constitutional text, history, and democratic values.11
rors and punishing those responsible).  Notice that political accountability is one of several
functionalist attributes often ascribed to a unitary executive.  Montesquieu, for instance,
supported a unitary executive on nondemocratic grounds, arguing that “[t]he executive
power ought to be in the hands of a monarch; because this branch of government, which
has always need of expedition, is better administered by one than by many.” MONTES-
QUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 206 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Univ.
of Cal. Press 1977).
6 See infra Parts I, V.  For example, the country celebrated its sesquicentennial the
same year that the Court decided the landmark Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Such questions have indeed taken on heightened importance as the administrative state,
and hence the plausible scope of “executive power,” has grown in an unprecedented man-
ner in recent decades.
7 See Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information
Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 359 (2010) (noting that the
unitary executive theory is “[n]o longer just the credo of the Federalist Society and Reagan
Republicans, it has attained mainstream constitutional status and won adherents across the
political spectrum” (footnote omitted)).
8 See infra Parts II, IV.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1385, 1393–94 (2008) (explaining that the electoral process does not adequately
allow voters to control the executive’s policy choices because voter-friendly and special
interest–friendly policies can be bundled); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethink-
ing Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 456–65 (2010) (provid-
ing an excellent account of functional criticisms of the unitary executive and arguing the
merits of “fiduciary representation”); Farina, supra note 7, at 360 (stating that the unitary R
executive “threatens the values of expertise and legality that have been foundations of the
modern administrative state”); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1741, 1742–43 (2009) (arguing that presidential control over information flow functionally
reduces the public’s ability to hold him accountable); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the National-
ist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1261 (2006) (arguing that
presidents face incentives to be more parochial than their status as the only nationally
elected official suggests, while Congress as a body exhibits less parochialism than one
might expect based on its members’ electoral foundations); Matthew C. Stephenson, Opti-
mal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008) (arguing for the benefits
of incomplete control over the bureaucracy).
11 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 93–94 (1994) (explaining that “unitariness” was a value held by the
framers and that the executive’s authority changes not because of a change in values but a
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Given the elegance of Hamilton’s proposition, and the growing
consensus among scholars and jurists, one may be forgiven for taking
the connection between doctrinal innovations promoting a unitary ex-
ecutive and increased political accountability as granted.  Yet it is re-
markable that no empirical study examines the consequences of
unitary judicial decisions for this constitutional value.  This is of
course far from saying that empirical scholars have neglected the rela-
tionship between bureaucracy and democratic governance.12  Scholars
have long considered the issue of “representativeness” in bureau-
cracy.13  A sprawling literature considers the extent to which the politi-
cal branches might control the bureaucracy.14  More directly
change in our understanding of how the value is best implemented); Calabresi, supra note
5, at 37 (providing a series of normative arguments in favor of a unitary executive); Elena R
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2333–36 (2001) (arguing that
concentrating authority over the bureaucracy comports with legal theory and advances
democratic values); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era,
1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2005) (arguing that presidents defended the unitari-
ness of the executive over the period studied, rejecting attempts of congressional
influence).
12 See, e.g., Alı´cia Adsera` et al., Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of
Government, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 445, 459 (2003) (studying cross-national panel data and
finding that “the quality of bureaucracy” is positively influenced by democracy and by news-
paper readership and that corruption in the U.S. is responsive to newspaper readership).
13 For an early example, see J. DONALD KINGSLEY, REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE 186 (1944) (observing that bureaucracies
“become states within states, perfecting elaborate machinery for their governance and re-
ducing to a minimum the area of detailed supervision by political organs”); see also SALLY
COLEMAN SELDEN, THE PROMISE OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: DIVERSITY AND RESPON-
SIVENESS IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY 65–111 (1997) (studying the relationship between bu-
reaucratic policy and representation of women and minorities in the bureaucracy, focusing
on the Farmers Home Administration’s Rural Housing Loans program).
14 For recent examples, see WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY
AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 71–116 (3d ed. 2013); KENNETH J.
MEIER & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR., BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE: A GOVERNANCE
PERSPECTIVE 1–92 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Ad-
ministrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 51
(2006) (surveying agency officials and “conclud[ing], somewhat paradoxically, that agen-
cies, though not comprising elected officials, may better promote political accountability
than the White House”).  A recent strand of this literature on political control stresses that
tighter political control over agencies may dampen agencies’ incentives to acquire informa-
tion, suggesting a trade-off between political control and the quality of bureaucratic policy.
On this point, see, for example, Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discre-
tion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536, 547–50 (2002); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisi-
tion and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1459–60 (2011) (noting that
divergence in preferences between agency and overseer increases the agency’s incentives
to conduct research relevant to regulatory projects).  For some evidence suggesting a
trade-off between political control and the quality of bureaucracy, see David E. Lewis &
Abby K. Wood, Judicial Deference and Agency Accountability: A Federal FOIA Experiment
24 (unpublished manuscript), available at https://my.vanderbilt.edu/davidlewis/files/
2011/12/lewis-and-wood-paper-v.9.pdf (examining the relationship between agency attrib-
utes and the quality and timing of agency responses to Freedom of Information Act re-
quests, finding that agencies with more political appointees perform more poorly on such
metrics).
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supporting the unitarian premise, we have evidence that presidential
elections influence rulemaking behavior, particularly by executive
agencies,15 suggesting that administrations act as if in control of and
politically accountable for regulatory choices.  Consistent with this
pattern, we also have evidence that the media connects the President
more with executive than independent agencies, plausibly leading vot-
ers to an understanding of what they might reasonably hold presiden-
tial administrations accountable for.16  Though not focused on the
United States, a cognate literature in comparative politics, likewise,
studies accountability in political systems with authority more or less
diffused among institutions,17 tending to support the unitarian
perspective.
But even if informative about institutional arrangements that
stand in equilibrium, existing studies cast faint light on the choices
faced by judges or on the consequences that flow from judicial deci-
sions.  Virtually all existing research on this topic of political accounta-
bility examines static, unchanging institutional settings.  So being, we
subsist on assertion when considering the relationship between “unita-
rian” judicial decisions, which by nature tend to upset an equilibrium,
and the value of political accountability.  When courts restructure in-
stitutions to promote a unitary executive, do they support the func-
tionalist value of political accountability?18  Despite a large literature
on interbranch relations,19 we have little guidance on this question of
institutional dynamics and constitutional values.20
15 See, e.g., Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Inform-
ative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2014) (observing patterns in rulemak-
ing behavior that indicate presidential administrations act as if the public holds presidents
accountable for agency actions, particularly executive agency actions).
16 See, e.g., Alex Ruder, Mass Media and the Political Accountability of the Bureau-
cracy 3 (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
~aruder/varianceFTC.pdf (finding that the mass media associates the President with exec-
utive agencies more than independent agencies, thereby “offer[ing] voters an accurate
assessment of presidential responsibility over agencies”). See also infra notes 156–59. R
17 See infra note 84 and accompanying text. R
18 In this sense, this Article addresses a recent challenge by a scholar that
“[p]residential boosters must prove, not simply assume, the superior democratic creden-
tials of their institutional favorite.”  Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L.
REV 1, 60 (2013).
19 For an excellent account of interbranch relations, see LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS
OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE xi (4th ed. 1998) (noting a general prin-
ciple that “an initiative by one branch sets in motion a series of compensatory actions by
the other branch,” and articulating how the executive and legislature largely share consti-
tutional powers).
20 Scholars more often consider the implications of the nondelegation doctrine for
political accountability through a dynamic lens, imagining the legislative response to judi-
cial decisions. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
319–20 (2000) (describing the conventional account).  This difference in focus may owe to
the fact that the nondelegation doctrine typically addresses legislative behavior, inviting
thoughts of behavioral responses to judicial decisions.  By contrast, the unitary executive
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A critical initial observation is that judicial decisions ostensibly
promoting a unitary executive do not necessarily have this effect and
may in fact engender plural control of government administration.21
Consider Justice Byron White’s vivid dissent in Chadha,22 the landmark
Supreme Court case invalidating the legislative veto—a device that al-
lows the legislature to review and veto the actions of administrative
agencies.  There, Justice White argued that the legislative veto acted as
an “important if not indispensable” legislative tool to “balance” the
administrative state.23  After the loss of the legislative veto, the legisla-
ture, one might speculate,24 turned to a multitude of substitute de-
vices to “re-balance” delegations.25  These alternative devices plausibly
prove more damaging to the unitary objective of accountability for
executive functions than the legislative veto itself.26  Thus, it is far
from clear that judicial decisions attempting to impose unitary condi-
tions enhance political accountability.  Unitarian judicial interven-
tions may, indeed, invite pluralism in government administration and
inhibit the sought-after lines of democratic responsibility.  Even if one
agrees with Hamilton and Wilson, one must still question the wisdom
of judicial efforts to concentrate trust and power in the executive.
Motivated by this ambiguity over the consequences of judicial de-
cisions, this Article provides the first empirical evidence on the con-
nection between unitarian judicial decisions and political
accountability.  For most of the Article I focus on the legislative veto,
the subject of Justice White’s dissent in Chadha, as a window into the
wider implications of unitary doctrinal innovations.  The legislative
veto is attractive primarily for two reasons.  Substantively, the veto is
widely recognized as a potent legislative tool in the context of the
modern administrative state, the topic of a landmark Supreme Court
case and innumerable law review articles.  Prosaically, the veto is at-
decisions typically address some institutional device established by the legislature, perhaps
rendering behavioral responses to judicial decisions a more distant thought.
21 This argument may fairly be read as an extension of arguments made elsewhere.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,
540–43 (1992) (understanding the legislative veto as an attempt by Congress to re-balance
lawmaking toward the “original” constitutional arrangement).  I advance a similar dynamic
perspective, though I emphasize the legislature’s manifold approaches to re-balancing, and
I connect these dynamics to the functional goal of political accountability.
22 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–1003 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 971–72.
24 See infra Part II.B.
25 For an excellent analysis of the constitutionally valid instruments through which
Congress can manipulate agencies, see Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 69–139 (2006).
26 See id. at 144; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (invalidating an
institutional arrangement and noting that Congress “in effect has retained control over the
execution” for the statute in question (emphasis added)).  Here, and elsewhere, the Court
gives considerable attention to the functional outcomes promoted by its decisions, even as
the Court adopts formalist constitutional reasoning. See infra Part I.
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tractive because it is relatively easy to identify and track, an important
consideration in an empirical study.27  Toward the end of the Article,
I consider a range of judicial decisions dealing with institutional ar-
rangements other than the legislative veto.
Unfortunately, it is highly challenging to address this topic in an
empirically rigorous fashion at the federal level.  This follows for a
straightforward reason: we have only a single federal government, and
we therefore have no natural comparison group.  We have no credible
way, in other words, to say what would have happened at the federal
level in the absence of Chadha.28  The states, however, represent a fer-
tile ground for helping us understand the role of unitary doctrinal
innovations.29  The states tend to have broadly similar constitutional
frameworks,30 yet they also differ in ways relevant to debates ongoing
at the federal level.  Heuristically, the approach I adopt allows us to
compare outcomes in one state to outcomes in similar states, thereby
accounting for important cross-state trends in factors that influence
bureaucratic and legislative behavior.31  The insights we gather at the
state level then provide a perspective into the operation of our federal
system, the ultimate object of interest.
The findings, in brief, from this state-based exercise indicate two
related consequences of unitary judicial decisions.  First, consistent
with Justice White’s suggestion, legislatures appear to respond in pre-
dictable ways when courts strip them of devices to control the adminis-
trative state: they augment the use of substitute tools to control the
bureaucracy, such as influence achieved through appropriations.  Sec-
ond, using an original dataset of roughly 7,000 newspaper articles, I
show that the invalidation of the veto invited, if anything, more plural
control over administration and a closer connection between the ad-
ministrative state and the legislature, not the executive—an outcome
27 The Council of State Governments annually publishes The Book of the States, a de-
tailed abstract of state-level institutions. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF
THE STATES (2010).
28 However, we can construct compelling narratives about the connections between
events.  See, for instance, revisions to the Reorganization Act of 1977 passed in the after-
math of Chadha, discussed infra Part II.B.
29 In this sense, the Article follows Justice Brandeis’s notion that the states serve as
laboratories for learning about the consequences of different policies and institutions. See
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .”).  This Article hardly represents the first effort
to gain understanding about the federal Constitution through examination of state consti-
tutions. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separa-
tion of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190–91 (1999) (providing an
overview of how states interpret the separation of powers doctrine, particularly when the
state constitution contains a separation of powers clause).
30 See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 27, at 3–17. R
31 For instance, regional or national trends may induce legislatures to be more or less
active independent of any consequences that follow from doctrinal changes.
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contrary to the expectations of proponents of unitary executive doc-
trines, but one consistent with a legislative backlash to the judicial de-
cision.  I further find linkages in the newspaper accounts between the
judicial decision and specific devices adopted by the legislature in re-
sponse to the decision, binding the first empirical finding to the sec-
ond empirical finding.
This pattern of findings informs our views of the recent trend of
judicial decisions seeking to effectuate a more unitary executive.  I do
not quarrel with Hamilton’s elegant proposition, re-cast by Wilson,
and recently re-minted by the Court to hold that “[t]he diffusion of
power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”32  However, we still
must question the relationship between the value of political account-
ability and judicial decisions attempting to realize the vision of a uni-
tary executive.  Such judicial decisions, these findings suggest,
potentially induce a legislative “backlash,” with the legislature reassert-
ing itself by other means.  This dynamic plausibly cashes out in weaker
executive electoral accountability for administrative actions: paradoxi-
cally, the executive may be more, not less, politically accountable in
the absence of judicial decisions fostering a unitary executive.  These
findings urge us to consider whether the wave of judicial decisions
seeking to promote a unitary executive, which often follow a formalist
mode of reasoning,33 undermine the functionalist constitutional ob-
jective of political accountability.  Political accountability is an impor-
tant constitutional value, yet it is, at the least, no easy “trump” for
advocates of unitary judicial decisions.34
This Article proceeds in five Parts.  Part I discusses the founda-
tions of the unitary executive theory, emphasizing the role that the
functional goals, centrally political accountability, play in supporting
this constitutional perspective.  Part II focuses on the legislative veto
and sets forth alternative perspectives on the consequences of the in-
stitution for political accountability.  In Part III, I begin a series of
empirical assessments by studying the effects of a 1997 judicial deci-
sion in Missouri that mirrored Chadha in reasoning.  In particular, I
examine the effect of the decision on legislative drafting behavior us-
ing an original dataset of over 30,000 state session laws.  Part IV con-
tinues the case study of the Missouri judicial decision but with a focus
32 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155
(2010).
33 See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
853, 859–60 (1990) (describing the theory of formalism and constitutional interpretation).
Obviously, this descriptor does not apply to the interpretative decisions, such as Chevron,
which do not directly turn on constitutional concerns.
34 Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1741 (1996) (ar-
guing that “for most unitarian scholarship, accountability remains a trump,” even as such
theorists often consider competing values).
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on the implicit perceptions of administrative control reflected in state
newspaper reporting.  In Part V, I return the focus to the federal level
and discuss judicial decisions involving institutions other than the leg-
islative veto. Although the empirical assessments included in Part V
can only be tentative, I find patterns that resonate with the state-level
studies in Parts III and IV.  My conclusions follow in the final section.
I
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE VALUE
OF ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Unitary Executive Generally
Over the last three decades, the unitary executive theory has fun-
damentally shaped the vision of constitutional lawmaking in the
American republic.35  The core tenet of the theory is simple to state:
the exercise of discretionary executive power belongs, in one form or
another, to the President.36  Even if the office of the President itself
does not subsume all such discretion, the President, at least, retains
authority to veto exercises of the discretion or to remove officers exer-
cising such discretion.37  In this way, proponents of the unitary execu-
35 This Part of the Article draws on many of the same cases and observations I make in
another article, the central point of which is that concerns about political accountability
figure importantly in areas of administrative and constitutional law. See Stiglitz, supra note
15.  For other takes on this observation, see, for example, Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. R
Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at
1–2); Kitrosser, supra note 10. R
36 It is simple to state, but as the large literature on this topic suggests, hardly simple
in its implications.  The exercise of nondiscretionary, ministerial executive power generally
concerns unitary executive theorists less, though historically this distinction has not always
been respected as a relevant boundary by proponents of presidential control. See Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612–13 (1838) (responding to the argument that
the Take Care Clause permits the President control over nondiscretionary duties: “This . . .
doctrine . . . cannot receive the sanction of this Court.  It would be vesting in the President
a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its support in any part of the constitu-
tion; and is asserting a principle, which if carried out in its results to all cases falling within
it, would be clothing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of con-
gress, and paralyze the administration of justice.”).
37 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Execu-
tive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992).  The literature advancing this
general perspective is voluminous. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHISTOPHER S. YOO,
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); Cala-
bresi, supra note 5, at 58; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power R
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 593–99 (1994) (“[T]he President must be able to
control subordinate executive officers through the mechanisms of removal, nullification,
and execution of the discretion ‘assigned’ to them himself.”); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2322 R
(noting Supreme Court case law suggesting the Eecutive’s removal power); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1994) (noting that
“the Article II Vesting Clause seems to require” that any discretionary power given agency
officials “be subject to the President’s control”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 5 (“It R
was clear that ‘executive’ functions must be performed by officers subject to the unlimited
removal and broad supervisory power of the President.”).
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tive seek to invalidate restrictions on the exercise of executive
discretion.  As a practical matter, this often means invalidating con-
straints that tend to either promote bureaucratic autonomy or en-
hance congressional control over administrative agencies.
Advocates of the unitary executive find primary support in three
sources.  Textually, the theory is premised on the Vesting Clause and
the Take Care Clause of Article II.  The former provides that “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America,”38 with emphasis on the articles before “executive” and
“President,” along with the imperative “shall.”39  The latter provides
that “[the President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”40  Unitary theorists argue that history and unbroken practice
support this textual position.41  The term “executive power,” accord-
ing to one historical analysis, “had a well-known meaning before, dur-
ing, and after the Constitution’s ratification,” supporting the “chief
executive’s preeminence in law execution.”42
When these first two justifications falter, however, unitary theo-
rists turn to general notions of administrative or democratic values.43
For instance, Professors Lessig and Sunstein conclude “with reluc-
tance” that the historical vision of the unitary executive is “just plain
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
39 See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 705–06 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 37, at 1165. R
40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.  As discussed below, adherents of the unitary executive
theory downplay the significance of the fact that the Constitution allows “Heads of Depart-
ments” to appoint inferior officers, arguing that despite this language the President re-
mains in control of inferior officers. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Likewise, unitary
theorists downplay the Opinions Clause, which gives the President the right to opinions
from principal officers in the Departments and plausibly implies that the President does
not have the constitutional capacity to control principal officers. See U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1.
41 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
701, 819–20.
42 Id. at 705.  Notice, however, that this historical interpretation of the term “execu-
tive power” is contested. See infra note 50. R
43 Further, it is important to note that many see the force of the formalist interpreta-
tion as primarily deriving from a functionalist “root.” See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 34, at R
1740 (“[T]he formalist framework is simply the best means of making government more
responsive to the people . . . .  [T]he formalist version of separation of powers promotes
the Constitution’s fundamental goals of accountability and energy.”).  Notice that Chadha
itself, often criticized for being excessively formalistic in reasoning, appeals to functionalist
principles when it holds that, whatever the convenience of the veto device, “it is crystal
clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.”  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59
(1983).  For an argument that neither a strict formalist nor a strict functionalist perspective
provides a fully adequate understanding of separation of powers questions in the Constitu-
tion, see generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1939 (2011) (arguing that we should interpret clauses of the Constitution accord-
ing to principles of ordinary textual interpretation).
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myth.”44  Yet they support a unitary executive on the grounds of “ac-
countability, coordination, and uniformity in the execution of the
laws.”45  This is not an unreasonable way to evaluate the claims for a
unitary executive.  Constitutional clause frustrates constitutional
clause.  The Opinions Clause, for instance, plausibly implies that the
President enjoys the right to demand information from principal of-
ficers of the Departments but does not have the constitutional capac-
ity to control such officers directly.46  One might equally question the
formalist unitary position on the basis of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.47  Or one might observe that it is often not even clear whether
administrative agencies operate under the legislative or executive
flag.48  Or one might point out that the modern American state differs
in fundamental ways from the state that governed the modest
ratification-era agrarian society, questioning the informativeness of
ratification-era notions of executive administration.49  Or one might
question the construction of the ratification-era views.50  Sufficient
44 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2.  But for an opposing view, see Calabresi & R
Prakash, supra note 37, at 603–05. R
45 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2. R
46 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[H]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices . . . .”). See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 32 R
(posing the question, “[w]hat possible reason could there be for providing the President
with a constitutional power to demand written reports from officers over whom he already
had an inherent power of control?”).  Hamilton saw this tension but brushed it off, saying
of the clause, “[t]his I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it
provides would result of itself from the office.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 422 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
47 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”).
48 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578–79 (1984).  It is usually accepted, at least by
proponents of the unitary executive, that agencies exercise executive powers when they
interpret and implement statutes. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
475 (2001) (noting that a “certain degree of discretion, and thus lawmaking, inheres in
most executive or judicial action” (citation omitted)).  Yet the recalcitrant debates over the
nondelegation doctrine are founded on the contestable yet plausible proposition that
agencies, in fact, exercise legislative powers when they interpret statutes.
49 This is not to say, of course, that founding-era thoughts on constitutional structure
have no meaning.  Rather, the point is that founding-era thoughts may provide little gui-
dance on questions of what “executive power,” for instance, means in the context of the
modern bureaucratic state. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presiden-
tial Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 617 (1989) (“[W]hy should
we be bound, in our understanding of the President’s proper role vis-a`-vis a vast modern
administrative bureaucracy, by the conventional conceptualization of administration in an
entirely different world?”).
50 See FISHER, supra note 19, at 70 (“[T]he framers were never able to distinguish R
clearly between legislative and executive duties.”); Flaherty, supra note 34, at 1790 (noting R
that unitary theory “assumes that there was a generally understood bundle of authority
known as executive power”).
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textual and historical ambiguity exists, in any event, to propel many
scholars and jurists to examine democratic values as arbiters.
Beyond the limited range of text and history, two additional rea-
sons support our consideration of democratic values.  Most directly,
this reflects the practice of the Supreme Court.  The workaday
mechanics of the Supreme Court often turn on prosaic concerns re-
garding the workability of different institutional arrangements.51
Why, in this age of the unitary executive, do we suffer independent
agencies?  Why, even as the Court struck down dual for-cause protec-
tion, did it leave untouched single for-cause protection?  Why did Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens, who later wrote to invalidate the line item veto
and often stood against the expansion of executive power,52 establish
the deferential Chevron standard for reviewing agencies’ interpreta-
tions of statutes?53
The answer to all these questions is straightforward, even if some-
times obscured by doctrinal shrouds.  In the eyes of the Justices, at
least at the time of the relevant decisions, these positions served im-
portant democratic or administrative values.  For instance, Judge Rich-
ard Posner suggests that we tolerate for-cause removal because failing
to do so would represent a “seismic constitutional change” and invali-
date independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission.54
At times, the connection between democratic values—political
accountability in particular—is on the surface of judicial opinions.
Justice Stevens, for example, noted that delegation is a fact of modern
government,55 and he justified judicial deference to executive inter-
pretations of statutory ambiguities on the premise that the President is
“directly accountable to the people.”56  Similarly, in another case in-
volving statutory interpretation, Justice Stephen Breyer argued that
“the President and Vice President are the only public officials whom
51 In this sense, the Court heeds Justice Jackson’s admonition that “[w]hile the Con-
stitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.  It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  For a
more recent argument to similar effect, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 34 (2005) (observing that “our constitutional history has
been a quest for workable government, workable democratic government”).
52 See Dawn Johnsen, “The Essence of a Free Society”: The Executive Powers Legacy of Justice
Stevens and the Future of Foreign Affairs Deference, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2012).
53 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).
54 See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1392 (7th Cir. 1986).
55 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting the many circumstances under which a delega-
tion of legislative power may occur).
56 Id. at 865.
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the entire Nation elects”57 and therefore courts should defer to
agency interpretations of statutes.58
We find a similar theme on the constitutional questions of ap-
pointment and removal powers.  As Justice Harry Blackmun summa-
rizes, “[t]he Framers understood . . . that by limiting the appointment
power, they could ensure that those who wielded it were accountable
to political force and the will of the people.”59  The Supreme Court
invalidated restrictions on the President’s removal powers using simi-
lar reasoning in the recent case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board.60  Criticizing the dual for-cause
provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Court maintained
that “[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountabil-
ity. . . .  Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public
cannot determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a perni-
cious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.”61
A second further reason to turn to democratic values is that they
help reconcile democratic governance with the administrative state.
Plainly stated, it strikes many observers as odd that unelected bureau-
crats craft a wide range of public policies given that we live in a de-
mocracy.62  Perhaps the most common response to this incongruent
circumstance involves presidential accountability.63  Responding to
concerns about the broad delegation of authority to administrative
agencies, Professor Mashaw, for example, writes that “[a]ll we need do
is not forget there are . . . presidential elections and that, as the Su-
preme Court reminds us in Chevron, presidents are heads of adminis-
trations.”64  Likewise, then-Professor Kagan argued that “presidential
control of administration . . . possesses advantages over any alternative
control device in advancing . . . core democratic values,” such as “re-
57 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
58 On this question of the “nationalist” president, see generally Nzelibe, supra note 10. R
59 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991).
60 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
61 Id. at 3155 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) (observing that the problem of bureaucratic
legitimacy is “an intriguing but awkward family heirloom” that “is handed down from gen-
eration to generation”).
63 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462–63 (2003) (arguing that administrative law
scholars have “become so fixated on the concern for political accountability lately that we
have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administra-
tive arbitrariness”); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary,
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827,
841–57 (1996); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2331–39. R
64 Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985).
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sponsiveness and transparency.”65  Thus, we might care about the rela-
tionship between political accountability and judicially imposed
unitary innovations on solely normative grounds as we grapple with
the democratic legitimacy of the administrative state.66
The Court often develops its administrative and constitutional
law doctrines, either explicitly or implicitly, on the basis of functional
premises.  Scholars, likewise, often give these functional premises a
prominent place in their normative analyses.  This Article engages the
natural question of whether these premises have validity, with a focus
on the lessons we can learn from the history of the legislative veto.
B. The Case of the Legislative Veto
The legislative veto represents an important piece in the develop-
ment of unitarian institutions.  The legislative device, used by Con-
gress at least since President Franklin D. Roosevelt,67 involves a
qualified delegation of authority to administrative agencies.  Congress
passes a statute enabling an administrative agency to take some action
but then reserves the right to review the action ex post and possibly to
veto it.  Such legislative review takes various forms: the statute may
permit a legislative committee to exercise the veto, or the veto may be
subject to one- or two-house approval.68  But, in any event, the legisla-
tive veto requires something less than the approval of the executive.
Although this type of legislative review is anathema to the unitary
executive, Presidents abided the device for over half a century.69  This
executive countenance derived from self-interest rather than from
dim-wittedness, generosity, or respect for the contributions of a coor-
dinate branch.  Under a common view, the executive’s payoff from
65 Kagan, supra note 11, at 2332; see also RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE R
PRESIDENCY 1 (1983); RICHARD W. WATERMAN, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE STATE 1–2 (1989).
66 Note that presidential accountability may be the dominant approach, but it is not
the only normative solution to this “awkward” problem. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 63 R
(arguing for the importance of nonarbitrariness in understanding the legitimacy of the
administrative state); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (arguing that Congress controls the admin-
istrative state through administrative procedures, thereby legitimizing the bureaucracy);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L REV.
1511 (1992) (emphasizing the role of deliberation and civic republican values).
67 See Bernard Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution—A Reexamination, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351, 351–52 (1978).
68 See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 273, 273 (1993); see also Schwartz, supra note 67, at 357–58 (listing statutes that R
included legislative veto provisions in 1976).
69 See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 351–52; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 970 R
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“Over the quarter century following World War II, Presi-
dents continued to accept legislative vetoes by one or both Houses as constitutional, while
regularly denouncing provisions by which congressional Committees reviewed Executive
activity.”).
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the device came in the form of broader congressional delegations.  As
Professor Fisher observes, for example, “[b]y attaching the safeguard
of a legislative veto, Congress was willing to delegate greater discretion
and authority to the executive branch.”70  Nevertheless, to strict uni-
tarians, the status of the legislative veto was “crystal clear”—the device
was “abhorrent.”71
Indeed, the legislative veto directly undermined the central tenet
of the unitary executive: under the device, according to critics, control
over the administration of statutes was plainly plural rather than uni-
tary.72  By reviewing administrative rules, or at least threatening to do
so, the legislature invested itself in the implementation of laws.  As the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee acknowledged in a
post-Chadha hearing, “Congress increasingly used legislative veto to
control the executive branch in its most ‘executive’ activity: The daily
management of government.”73
At the federal level, the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative
veto in the landmark 1983 case of INS v. Chadha.74  The majority opin-
ion characterized the veto as an exercise of legislative powers and held
against the veto on the grounds that it violates the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses of Article I, Section 7.75  However, the opinion
below, authored by future Justice Anthony Kennedy, expressed con-
siderable uncertainty over the nature of the veto powers, considering
all three possibilities—judicial, executive, and legislative—and in all
events concluding the veto was unconstitutional.  With respect to ex-
ecutive powers, for instance, the lower court considered the possibility
that the purpose of the veto was to “share in the administration of the
statute.”76  Such sharing, the court concluded, represented “egre-
gious” meddling in executive affairs and “trespasses upon central
functions of the Executive.”77
70 Fisher, supra note 68, at 273.  Notice that Justice White’s Chadha dissent reflects this R
view, too. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 970–74 (White, J., dissenting).
71 Calabresi, supra note 5, at 73.  Note that here he refers to something less than two- R
house vetoes.  In other parts of his article he argues against the two-house veto as well.
72 But see Brief of the U.S. House of Representatives, Appellee-Petitioner at 25–26,
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (No. 80-2170) (arguing that if “Congress has withheld
from the Executive some part of the function of executing the whole of a statute, the
Executive has no more constitutional authorization to perform what has been withheld
than to ‘execute a law by disobeying it’”).
73 Legislative Veto After Chadha: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 98th Cong. 401
(1984) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
74 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
75 The legislative veto in question involved a one-house veto and an adjudicatory reg-
ulatory action.  Companion cases linked the Chadha holding with bicameral legislative ve-
toes, see U.S. Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), and with rulemaking regulatory actions,
see Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
76 Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 431 (9th Cir. 1980).
77 Id. at 432.
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II
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: MECHANICS AND PREDICTIONS
A. A Unitarian View
Hamilton’s concern regarding plurality in administration and its
tendency to “conceal faults”78 is fundamentally a concern about infor-
mation.79  Hamilton recognized that elections present voters with
crippling information problems: they observe outcomes, such as eco-
nomic performance and public corruption prosecutions, but they can-
not readily determine who is responsible for these outcomes or
whether the outcomes derive from good (bad) luck rather than good
(bad) administration.  All of this is true as a matter of course in a
separation of powers system,80 and, thought Hamilton, it is all the
more true in the context of plural control of the executive.
So characterized, a straightforward hypothesis emerges from the
unitary perspective: concentrating powers in the executive clarifies
lines of accountability, thereby allowing voters to punish (reward) the
executive for poor (good) performance.  As Hamilton warned of plu-
ral executives faced with poor performance:
[B]lame is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and
under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author.  The circumstances which may have
led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so
complicated that where there are a number of actors who may have
had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly
see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may
be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may
have been incurred is truly chargeable.81
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 2, at 405. R
79 Of course, plural institutions also raise concerns about the incentives faced by
elected officials.  The fact that it is harder to assign responsibility for performance reduces
the incentives to perform well.  As such, to the extent plural institutions decrease accounta-
bility, we might expect such institutions to also reduce state performance in relevant
respects.
80 For instance, even absent plural control over executive functions, the executive
may cast off blame for performance by arguing the failures of the legislature.  In a separa-
tion of powers system, the unitary executive, even in ideal form, is no easy cure for
problems of democratic accountability; the most that can be said of it is that it increases
democratic accountability. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in
American Politics, 109 DAEDALUS 25, 44 (Summer 1980) (“We hold our politicians individu-
ally accountable for the proposals they advocate, but less so for the adoption of those
proposals, and not at all for overseeing the implementation of those proposals and the
evaluation of their results.  In contemporary America officials do not govern, they merely
posture.”).  One straightforward understanding of the reason we, as voters, value posture
rather than results is that, in a separation of powers system, the former is under the control
of individual politicians and the latter is largely not.
81 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 2, at 406. R
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Under this view, a unitary executive removes some ambiguity sur-
rounding the “author” of the administrative actions.  This allows vot-
ers to more easily assess the characteristics of their leaders—
competence, honesty, and so on—and hence allows them to reward
or punish government performance.82
Far from a dusty revolutionary-era relic, we find echoes of this
unitarian logic in modern theories of democratic accountability.  The
observation that voters face a difficult problem of sorting out what
aspects of government performance to attribute to the actions of
elected officials motivates a sizable and growing strand of literature.83
Similarly, a literature in comparative politics studies the institutional
arrangements that promote electoral accountability for various as-
pects of government performance, most notably economic
performance.84
Moreover, this unitarian logic carries directly to the legislative
veto.  For instance, Representative Peter W. Rodino, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee around the time of Chadha, criticized the
legislative veto in terms that reflect Hamilton’s worries that “such du-
plication [of executive functions] reduces political accountability.
82 Note that a unitary executive was not the only institutional feature that the foun-
ders included in our constitutional system designed to advance this functional value.  For
example, the Origination Clause, which requires “[a]ll Bills for raising revenue,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, to begin in the House of Representatives, was designed to ensure a
connection between electoral accountability and a domain of policy decisions.  See Re-
becca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 659, 666 (2014) (noting the foreign roots of the clause, motivated by “the lower
house’s accountability to the people, which would minimize arbitrary, unfair, and overly
burdensome taxes”).
83 One way of conceiving the voters’ problem is as a signal extraction problem: voters
observe outcomes, such as the unemployment rate, and then face the challenge of filtering
out the parts of that outcome that cannot be attributed to the performance of the elected
official from the parts that can be attributed to the performance of the elected official.
This problem may fairly be seen as a foundational problem motivating Hamilton’s worries.
For recent research studying this problem, see, for example, Justin Wolfers, Are Voters
Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections (Jan. 30, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script) (studying the ability of voters to filter out the noise in economic performance in the
context of gubernatorial elections), available at http://users.nber.org/~jwolfers/Papers/
Voterrationality(latest).pdf; Ryan Bubb, Blame it on the Rain? Voter Rationality and Exog-
enous Economic Shocks 3–9 (Apr. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor) (studying the filtering problem in the context of Indian parliamentary elections).
84 See generally Christopher J. Anderson, The End of Economic Voting?  Contingency Dilem-
mas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 271, 281–86 (2007)
(quoting Federalist No. 70 for partial motivation and summarizing a movement in the com-
parative politics literature “to systematically tackle the issue of how differences in political
institutions impose limits on the relationship between the economy and government sup-
port”); see also RAYMOND M. DUCH & RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, THE ECONOMIC VOTE: HOW
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS CONDITION ELECTION RESULTS 252–86 (2008) (sum-
marizing the relevant literature and providing theory and evidence for the proposition that
“more concentrated [administrative] responsibility results in higher levels of economic vot-
ing”); Thomas J. Rudolph, Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility, 65
J. POL. 190, 209–11 (2003) (studying same in the context of American states).
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With both the executive branch and Congress involved in a particular
decision, neither branch will be truly responsible for that decision.”85
Another witness in the same hearing, Representative Sam B. Hall, ex-
pressed similar concerns.  He asked, “[w]ho would actually be respon-
sible for a regulatory decision and how would the public know who is
responsible?”86  Elsewhere, then-Assistant Attorney General Theodore
Olson worried that the legislative veto meant Congress would create
an “additional bureaucracy” to oversee the agencies, and that as a con-
sequence “the [regulatory] process [would] becom[e] even more mys-
terious and [K]afkaesque, intelligible only to lobbyists.”87
It is true, of course, that citizens may be able to sort out sensible
responses to the question of accountability.  A range of public interest
groups, for example, specialize in distilling information for voters on
just these questions.88  Likewise, one view of political campaigns is as a
battle of advocates, much as a trial, with each side presenting its best
case to the voters and highlighting the flaws in the opposition’s posi-
tions.89  The claim, therefore, is not that it is impossible for voters to
discern who is responsible for particular regulatory actions—at least
not as a general matter.  Rather, the claim is that the legislative veto
makes it more difficult for voters to hold government actors accounta-
ble for regulatory actions.  This, in any event, is the conventional story
that animates much theory and modern constitutional and adminis-
trative law doctrine.
85 Hearings, supra note 73, at 403 (statement of Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, R
H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
86 Id. at 597 (statement of Rep. Sam B. Hall).
87 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is, of course, fair to question whether
this is precisely what has transpired, though in the executive branch rather than the legisla-
tive branch. See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
WORKER SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (2011) (noting that the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs routinely “keeps secret the substance of the changes” it makes to
other agencies’ draft regulatory submissions).
88 See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 206 (1998) (noting that during elections a
wide array of actors, including interest groups, are able to offer advice to voters).  This is
not to say, of course, that heuristics allow voters to behave as if they had full information.
Heuristics have most value in stable environments that allow voters to learn the relation-
ship between, say, interest group positions and policy outcomes.  Such short cuts have less
value, naturally, when the relationship between the interest group position and the out-
come voters care about is fluid or less certain. See, e.g., Richard R. Lau & David P.
Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45
AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 953, 965–67 (2001) (finding varied usefulness of heuristics and less
utility when the “political environment is not structured according to [ ] prior
expectations”).
89 For a seminal article on the relationship between advocacy and information revela-
tion, see Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1, 17 (1999)
(studying the incentives to generate information in a system of advocacy).
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The conventional unitarian position is fundamentally a norma-
tive view about the best reading of the Constitution and the optimal
structure of government.  To the extent possible, administrative dis-
cretion should be concentrated in the hands of the executive.  The
unitary view, though, is less developed as a theory of how to realize its
overarching institutional objectives.  Scholars devote relatively little
consideration to the questions of whether reforming institutions will,
after institutions re-equilibrate, lead to increases or decreases in the
executive’s control over the administration.  Instead, the dominant
unitary approach appears to involve a direct transmission from nor-
mative view to prescription: a particular institutional device offends
unitary principles, therefore it must go.  As such, the unitary view is
not geared to provide a firm position on whether the legislature will
respond to the loss of the veto by altering its behavior.  However this
may be, the only reasonable position for a strict unitary theorist is
that, whatever the legislative response, the benefits of reforming insti-
tutions in the unitary direction justify the costs of any subsequent leg-
islative response.  Overall, therefore, it is hard to envision a unitary
theorist arguing that unitary innovations will do anything but concen-
trate authority over executive functions, such as control over regula-
tory affairs,90 in the hands of the President and enhance political
accountability for administrative actions.
B. Equilibration and Political Accountability
Much of the separation of powers doctrine follows static rather
than dynamic reasoning.  A common template for a case runs thus:
the Congress aggrandizes power at the expense of the Executive,
thereby trespassing upon the Executive’s formal or functional consti-
tutional domain.  The Court notes this trespass and invalidates the
legislative grab, satisfied that a rifle shot opinion has rebalanced the
state to its true constitutional form and function.  However, the Court
often neglects to address the questions of why the aggrandizement
transpired in the first instance and of Congress’s likely response to the
Court’s decision.91  Often, the Court neglects the possibility that
Congress’s response to the judicial decision undermines the very
objectives pursued by the Court.
This is, in fact, a relevant possibility in the context of the legisla-
tive veto.  As Justice White noted in his vivid Chadha dissent, Congress
90 In the context of the legislative veto, recall that future Justice Kennedy regarded
the device as “trespass[ing] upon central functions of the Executive.”  Chadha v. INS, 634
F.2d 408, 432 (9th Cir. 1980).
91 Justice White’s dissent in Chadha is perhaps best read as a complaint along these
lines. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968–74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (providing a
history of the legislative veto and discussing why Congress has come to rely on it).
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often used the legislative veto “to balance broad delegations,” refer-
ring to the veto as an “important if not indispensable” device in the
context of the modern regulatory state.92  The legislative veto, in
Justice White’s eyes, and in the eyes of many observers,93 represented
a critical institution that Congress used to control the bureaucracy.  A
sensible prediction, therefore, is that removing the legislative veto
from the congressional quiver induced Congress to rely more heavily
on alternative mechanisms of control.
After Chadha, a number of observers wrote postmortems predict-
ing and chronicling congressional responses to the case.94  A repre-
sentative but nonexhaustive list of mechanisms Congress supposedly
considered or turned to includes:
• Including state contingencies in statutes;
• Increased use of statutory sunset provisions;
• Heavier reliance on appropriations riders;
• More frequent and probing oversight hearings;
• Reliance on report-and-wait procedures.95
Although no study examines these possible responses empirically in
any detail, we have at least compelling narratives surrounding some
aspects of congressional behavior.  It seems fairly clear, for instance,
that Chadha induced Congress to revise the Reorganization Act of
1977.96  That law provided the President with powers to reorganize
administrative agencies without consulting Congress.  The Act, how-
ever, also provided that such reorganizations would be subject to legis-
lative vetoes.  The year after Chadha, Congress revised the Act to
provide that any presidential reorganization was invalid absent a joint
resolution,97 a legislative procedure that, as Professor Fisher notes,
formally complied with Chadha but clearly left the President relatively
hemmed in by Congress.98  Such relatively clear instances of congres-
sional response encourage a view of a more widespread pattern of
congressional adaptations.
92 Id. at 971–72.
93 See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 21, at 541 (contending that the legislative R
veto partially restores the original balance of power between the branches of government).
94 See, e.g., Elliott H. Levitas & Stanley M. Brand, Congressional Review of Executive and
Agency Actions After Chadha: “The Son of Legislative Veto” Lives On, 72 GEO. L.J. 801, 802–07
(1984) (providing alternatives to the legislative veto); Richard B. Smith & Guy M. Struve,
Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1258, 1258 (1983) (proposing that
Congress enact statutes that would allow Congress to review executive actions).
95 Congress codified this report-and-wait procedure in the Congressional Review Act.
See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012).
96 See Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29 (codified in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 901–912 (2012)).
97 See Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, § 3(a), 98 Stat.
3192, 3192 (codified in 5 U.S.C. § 906 (2012)).
98 For an excellent account of this response to Chadha, see Fisher, supra note 68, at R
286.
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The simple recognition that the legislature may adapt to the loss
of the veto drives a wedge between normative impulse and doctrinal
prescription present in the standard unitary view.  That is, even if,
ceteris paribus, removing the veto consolidates executive power, clari-
fies lines of administrative responsibility, and enhances political ac-
countability, we should question the premise that all else, in fact,
remains equal following a judicial intervention.  Following the sense
of legal observers after Chadha, we should examine whether judicial
decisions limiting one method of congressional control over the
administration induces Congress to amplify other methods of congres-
sional control.  This institutional “balancing” or “equilibrating” ap-
proach to interbranch relations suggests that if the Court removes one
important device of congressional control, we can expect Congress to
reply by using other devices of control with increased frequency.
This perspective introduces ambiguity into our assessment of the
relationship between doctrinal innovations and political accountabil-
ity.  After recognizing that Congress did not sit idly as the Court
stripped it of the veto, we have considerable uncertainty regarding
whether the loss of the veto resulted in a more or less plural executive,
or tightened the line of responsibility between the executive and ad-
ministrative actions.  The veto, for all its faults, implicated a public
dialogue between the executive and the legislature—if the legislature
wished to set aside a regulation, and the executive thought he had the
“better” position, by public lights, the legislature would be forced to
publicly veto the regulatory measure.99  Not all of the substitute
devices of control implicate such a public dialogue.  Appropriations
riders, for instance, may attract comparatively little attention, even as
they achieve the same objective of influencing regulatory behavior.  In
this way, the congressional responses to the judicial decision may, in
fact, have led to more obscure lines of responsibility, with voters rela-
tively unsure over whether the executive or the legislature authored a
particular action.  Moreover, the alternative devices available to the
legislature may have augmented legislative control over administra-
tion.100  Thus, the invalidation of devices of plural administration,
99 For a seminal article on the information properties of veto bargaining, see Tim
Groseclose & Nolan McCarty, The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience, 45 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 100, 102–03 (2001) (showing that veto bargaining can increase the public’s
awareness of policy positions adopted by elected representatives).
100 Note that this balancing theory faces a challenge of explaining why, if these alterna-
tive tools prove more effective than the veto, the legislature used the veto in the first in-
stance.  One possibility is that Missouri simply followed other states in adopting the
legislative veto and institutional inertia ensued.  Another possibility is that employing these
other tools results in a redistribution of authority within the legislature that is unfavorable
to individuals, such as House or Senate leaders, even if these alternative tools enhance the
legislature’s influence over the bureaucracy. Cf. Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Con-
trol the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J. L. ECON. &
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such as the legislative veto, plausibly attenuates the executive’s politi-
cal accountability for administrative actions.
However plausible this account may be, it remains unsubstanti-
ated.  Notice at the outset that observations at the federal level consti-
tute loose evidence for the simple reason that we have no credible way
to determine congressional behavior absent Chadha.  Scholars have as-
sembled some limited evidence at the state level, yet here too the con-
nection between the veto and changes in legislative behavior is not
explicit.101  Thus, although some indirect evidence supports the pre-
mise, no study to my knowledge squarely addresses the question of
whether the loss of the legislative veto leads legislatures to adopt
compensating behavior or the question of the relationship between
this behavior, to the extent it exists, and political accountability.
C. The States as a Testing Ground
The states represent a fruitful domain in which to assess these
perspectives.  Variation in institutions at the state level allows us to
draw inferences not possible at the federal level.  We cannot credibly
say what federal lawmaking activity or elections might have looked like
had the Court allowed the legislative veto to stand in Chadha.  We have
no counterfactual federal government to consider, and we therefore
cannot assess the consequences of the decision in a credible way.  The
states, on the other hand, adopted and removed the legislative veto at
various times, for assorted reasons, and this variation allows us to ex-
amine the effect of the veto on political accountability.  For example,
heuristically, political and economic trends in Pennsylvania or New
ORG. 101 (1997) (observing that the internal organization of the legislature influences the
tools used to control agencies).  A third is that these alternative tools are more costly to
use, discouraging their earlier use, and also more difficult to calibrate, their effect perhaps
not adjusting smoothly to changes in legislative effort, resulting in perhaps transitory legis-
lative “overcompensation.”  A fourth possibility is that the overcompensation follows from
uncertainty over the effectiveness of the alternative tools, combined with risk aversion.
Here, I simply recognize the problem and raise these possibilities, deferring resolution for
later efforts.
101 Professor Huber and colleagues, for instance, examined statutes relating to Medi-
caid passed in the aftermath of the 1994 election, finding that the statutes passed by legisla-
tures in states without legislative vetoes granted less discretion to the executive over
Medicaid policy. See John D. Huber et al., Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy, 45
AM. J. POL. SCI. 330, 341 (2001).  However, the relationship observed in Professor Huber’s
study may reflect unobserved state-level characteristics.  For example, states with vetoes
may have less delegation due to some cultural characteristic associated with concern over
executive discretion.  It thus is not entirely clear whether legislatures treat statutory con-
trols and the legislative veto as substitutes.  Another recent study surveyed state legislators
and found that lawmakers in states without the legislative veto express a stronger prefer-
ence for using statutory controls. See Sarah J. Poggione & Christopher Reenock, Political
Insulation and Legislative Interventions: The Impact of Rule Review, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 456,
473–74 (2009).  While informative, and certainly interesting, our interest is in legislative
behavior, not stated legislative preferences.
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York serve as plausible counterfactuals for New Jersey, had the state
not introduced the veto by constitutional amendment in 1992.
I define the legislative “veto” in a way analogous to the device the
Court invalidated in Chadha.  The state institution for legislative re-
view (a) must have the power to veto an administrative rule, and
(b) this power must not be conditional on executive consent.  Thus,
in contrast to some existing studies, I exclude forms of legislative re-
view that involve only advisory powers, or powers to “suspend” rules,102
or powers conditional in some way on the executive’s or the promul-
gating agency’s approval.103  I also do not classify states that refuse to
delegate any authority to state agencies, such as West Virginia, Ten-
nessee, and Colorado, as possessing the legislative veto.104  In such
states, no administrative rule takes effect unless enacted by the legisla-
ture.  This institutional posture, while questionable on policy grounds
and perhaps contrary to the spirit of unitary theory, does not run
afoul of Chadha.105
State-level adoption of the legislative veto roughly followed the
same pattern as the federal level.  As state economies became more
complex, state legislatures found themselves delegating ever-greater
responsibilities to state executives.  To check these expansive delega-
tions, many legislatures adopted the legislative veto, beginning with
Kansas in 1939,106 not long after the introduction of the device at the
federal level.107  Since then, some twenty other states have adopted
the legislative veto in one form or another.108  Also mirroring events
at the federal level, a number of state courts invalidated the legislative
veto during the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the veto threatened to
develop into a preeminent institutional device.  Doctrinally, these
102 The power to suspend rules is typically limited to a short period of a few weeks;
clearly, as suspension duration increases, suspension powers approach veto powers. See,
e.g., Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in Missouri: A Constitutional
Virus, 57 MO. L. REV. 1157, 1182–83 (1992) (detailing how in Wisconsin, the Joint Commit-
tee for Review of Administrative Rules has the power to temporarily suspend administrative
rules).
103 See, e.g., id. at 1175–76 (noting how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission to be a legislative agency and decided that the legis-
lature can override the Commission’s policy statements, but a concurrent resolution must
be presented to the governor for approval).
104 See JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. OF POLICY INTEGRITY, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, 52 EX-
PERIMENTS WITH REGULATORY REVIEW: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INPUTS INTO STATE
RULEMAKINGS (2010), available at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/52_Experi
ments_with_Regulatory_Review.pdf.
105 Recently, some groups have advocated such a policy at the federal level.  The
so-called Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act would require
agencies to obtain affirmative approval for new rules before they become effective. See
H.R. 10, 112th Cong. (2011).
106 See Dean supra note 102, at 1160 n.24. R
107 See id.
108 See infra Part III.
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state cases tend to follow the contours noted above, with challenges
based either on a “usurpation” of executive powers109 or on the failure
of the legislature to follow the constitutionally prescribed procedures
for producing legislation.110  However, most legislative vetoes remain
in place today, and some states countered rulings of their highest
courts by passing constitutional amendments.111  Recently, New
Jersey, in 1992, and North Dakota, in 1995, adopted the legislative
veto.112  Yet in both of these recent cases, the institutional changes
reflected the constitutional concerns articulated in the 1980s cases:
New Jersey, responding to a 1982 state Supreme Court case, passed a
constitutional amendment to allow the veto; and North Dakota’s veto
statute provides that if the veto is invalidated by the courts, the legisla-
ture instead defaults to “suspension” powers.  I plot the number of
states with the legislative veto in each year in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. INCIDENCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
109 See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 635–36
(Kan. 1984) (noting that the veto in Kansas allows the legislature to “modify, reject or
revoke any rules or regulations,” and that this is “a significant interference by the legislative
branch with the executive branch and constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of
powers”).
110 See, e.g., Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530, 542 (Mich. 2000) (finding that a
committee of the Michigan legislature acted in an inherently legislative matter without
adhering to the enactment and presentment requirements of the Michigan Constitution).
111 See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4(6) (amended 1992).
112 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03.3 (1997).
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Missouri recently lost the veto in 1997.113  Missouri introduced
the legislative veto in 1976,114 part of a wave of adoptions responding
to the growth of administrative government.  The state twice rejected
proposed constitutional amendments aimed at shielding the veto
from the evidently gathering constitutional storm, once in 1976 and
again in 1982,115 but Chadha-type litigation largely passed over Mis-
souri.  In 1997, however, a group of citizens seeking to benefit from
an environmental regulation stalled by the veto convinced the Mis-
souri Supreme Court to invalidate the veto on now-familiar
grounds.116  The legislative veto, the court held, ran afoul of both the
state equivalent of Article 1, Section 7 and the separation of powers
provision of the state constitution.117
Most of this Article focuses on Missouri’s experience after its
Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto.  Missouri holds inter-
est for a simple and prosaic reason: it represents the state with a re-
cent change to its veto regime, and we therefore have access to a great
deal of information about its experiences.  The fact that Missouri
switched its veto regime in 1997, while other states did not, allows us
to draw credible inferences about the consequences of losing the leg-
islative veto.  First, did the court’s ruling compel the legislature to
adopt alternative devices to control the bureaucracy?  For example,
113 See Mo. Coalition for the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125,
136 (Mo. 1997).  Michigan lost the veto more recently than Missouri. See Blank, 611
N.W.2d at 542.  However, Michigan’s geographic location, bordering Canada and Lake
Michigan, makes it more difficult to find credible comparison states: only two states have
land borders with Michigan (Indiana and Ohio).  Two states have adopted the legislative
veto since 1990: New Jersey, which passed a constitutional amendment allowing for the
device in 1992, and North Dakota, which introduced the veto by statute.  In particular,
North Dakota changed the relevant portion of the code to provide that:
The committee on administrative rules may find a rule or portion of a rule
void if the committee makes the specific finding that, with regard to that
rule or portion of a rule, there is: a. An absence of statutory authority.
b. An emergency relating to public health, safety, or welfare.  c. A failure to
comply with express legislative intent or to substantially meet the procedu-
ral requirements of this chapter for adoption of the rule.  d. A conflict with
state law. e. Arbitrariness and capriciousness.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03.3(1) (1997).  Thus, starting in 1995, a legislative committee
held the power to void administrative rules for a wide range of reasons.  Prior to this
change, the legislative committee had the authority to “object” to administrative rules, the
consequence of which was to shift the burden of persuasion against the agency in the event
of judicial review. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03.3 (1991).
114 See Dean, supra note 102, at 1161. R
115 As the state court notes in Missouri Coalition, “Senate Joint Resolution No. 29 was
defeated August 3, 1976 and House Resolution No. 36 was defeated on November 2, 1982.”
948 S.W.2d at 129 n.5.
116 Id. at 136.
117 Id. at 133 (“[The statutory provision] violates constitutional principles concerning
the separation of executive and legislative functions in at least two ways.  It permits the
legislature: 1) to unconstitutionally interfere with the functions of the executive branch;
and 2) to circumvent the constitution’s bill passage and presentment requirements.”).
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did the legislature pass more tightly written or restrictive appropria-
tions bills?  Second, what consequences did this re-equilibration, to
the extent it transpired, have on the functional objectives associated
with the theory of the unitary executive?  I address these questions in
Parts III and IV, respectively.
III
VETO LOSS AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
Did the Missouri legislature respond to the judicial decision by
reasserting control through alternative avenues?  An initial indication
of the legislature’s response is that it passed revisions to the state’s
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in the same session as the deci-
sion.118  The revisions clarify that, notwithstanding the judicial deci-
sion, agency rules would be invalid if the promulgating agency did not
submit proposed rules to the legislature’s regulatory oversight com-
mittee, and that no final rule takes effect until thirty days after submit-
ting it to the legislature.119  The revisions also provide, ominously, that
the oversight committee “may refer comments or recommendations
concerning such [final] rule to the appropriations and budget com-
mittee of the house of representatives and the appropriations commit-
tee of the senate for further action.”120
As further evidence of the legislative responses, I examine two
metrics related to the drafting and funding behavior of the legisla-
ture.121  A first drafting metric relates to the “permissiveness” of dele-
gations of rulemaking authority from the legislature to agencies.
Drawing from the key words noted in Judge David S. Tatel’s American
Trucking Associations dissent, which chronicles a number of broad dele-
gations from Congress to administrative agencies, I examine the num-
118 See S.B. 900, 89th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998).  In the immediate after-
math of the judicial decision, the legislature appears to have passed a stopgap measure,
H.B. 850, 89th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997), which delays the effective date of
regulations until thirty legislative days after the promulgating agency submits the rule to
the legislature’s regulatory oversight committee.
119 Mo. S.B. 900.
120 Id.
121 I also consider a third such measure: the number of defined terms in statutes.  I
identify such definitions using the following regular expression: ‘(\”|word|term).{0,100}
mean’.  Thus, I seek out language that uses either quotation marks or refers to a “word” or
“term,” and then quickly discusses the meaning of that word or term.  The loss of the veto
appears to have no influence on the legislature’s use of defined terms (results available on
request to author).  The average number of defined terms remains fairly constant through-
out the series: on average, a delegating statute (see discussion of permissive words) con-
tained 0.96 defined terms per 1,000 words in 1990 and 1.02 defined terms per 1,000 words
in 2004 (8.12 and 8.4 in raw counts per statute).  One interpretation of this pattern is that,
even at the start of the series, legislatures may have heavily employed defined terms, and
that further increasing the use of defined terms held little value.
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ber of permissive words per 1,000 words of statute.122  For my analysis
related to this measure, I attempt to limit attention to session laws that
explicitly grant rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.123
A second measure builds directly off the ominous suggestion
presented in the revision to the APA.  In particular, I examine limiting
appropriations riders, which serve to prevent, condition, or otherwise
limit agencies’ expenditure of funds for specified purposes.124  At the
federal level, Congress has used this approach to substantively control
agency behavior in a wide range of policy areas, from education to
transportation.125  And, just as with the legislative veto, scholars have
criticized the practice of including riders in appropriations bills as
both an inappropriate form of lawmaking and an unwarranted inter-
ference with the executive’s administrative prerogatives.126  Some ob-
servers even argue that the practice is unconstitutional under
separation of powers doctrine, much again as is the case with the legis-
lative veto.127
To implement these indicators of legislative response, I obtain
the complete text of all session laws passed in Missouri and several
comparison states between 1990 and 2004, a total of over 30,000 stat-
utes containing, in aggregate, over 100 million words.128  As depicted
in Figure 2, I select all bordering states with legislatures that convene
on an annual basis as comparison states: Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
122 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057–62 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Tatel, J., dissenting).  There, Judge Tatel observes cases involving generous grants of
rulemaking authority.  In relevant part, the grants of authority tend to use the following
words: “fair,” “public,” and “reasonable.”  I consider these words, in addition to “may,” as
indications of permissive grants of authority (note that I distinguish the term “may” from
the term “may not” in this analysis).
123 I do so by limiting attention to session laws that both mention an agency or admin-
istrator (“agency,” “bureau,” “board,” “commission,” “department,” “director,” “secretary,”
“administrator,” “division”) and also use the word “promulgate.”  Roughly 6,000 of the over
30,000 laws meet these criteria.
124 This type of rider is distinguished from earmarks, which affirmatively reserve funds
for a specified purpose.  Unlike earmarks, limiting riders bear a close resemblance to ve-
toes in the sense that they serve to negate agency actions, programs, or policies.
125 See generally Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Rid-
ers, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456 (noting the trend of increasing appropriations riders and criticizing
them as an inappropriate method of substantive lawmaking); Beermann, supra note 25, at R
85–86 (describing several examples of appropriations riders).  Recently, for example,
Congress refused to fund the enforcement of a new light bulb efficiency standard, giving
renewed life to less efficient incandescent bulbs. See Ed O’Keefe, The Winners and Losers of
the New Spending Bill, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
the-fix/wp/2014/01/13/the-winners-and-losers-of-the-new-spending-bill/.
126 See Devins, supra note 125, at 458. R
127 See, e.g., Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experi-
ence, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1377–83 (1980); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity
at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457,
521–22 (1997).
128 I download the session laws from various Lexis databases.
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Kansas, Illinois, and Tennessee.129  By virtue of geography and history,
these states have roughly similar institutional frameworks and serve as
plausible comparisons for Missouri.  All of the states have reasonably
professional legislatures.130  For example, all of the legislatures pro-
vide personal staff to members, in most cases during the entire year,
and at least while the legislature is in session.131
Using these textual data, I conduct a series of customized
searches to determine whether each of the 30,000-plus session laws
contains either (a) a permissive delegation to an agency, as above, or
(b) a limiting appropriations rider.132  Table 1 provides summary sta-
tistics, by state, for each of these metrics, along with some other basic
information about state drafting practices.  To give a sense of drafting
practices, the average Missouri law contains about 4,000 words,
roughly on par with Illinois and Nebraska, somewhat greater than the
number of words used by the Kansas and Iowa legislatures, and far
greater than the number of words used by the Tennessee legislature.
Relative to the other states, Missouri’s legislature is an inactive
lawmaker, passing roughly one-third the number of laws as Tennessee;
of course, Missouri’s statutes are relatively long, and so this may simply
reflect different state practices in passing omnibus legislation.  Now
consider the two delegation metrics of interest: the use of permissive
language and the use of appropriations riders.  With respect to riders,
Tennessee is the most zealous user, and Iowa is the most reluctant.
Notice that this simple pattern suggests, but hardly establishes, the
substitutability of the veto with other forms of control, as Iowa pos-
sesses the veto and Tennessee does not.  With respect to permissive
language, most states cluster around 6.5 permissive words per 1,000
129 Restricting the comparisons to legislatures with annual meetings removes Arkansas
and Kentucky from the analysis.
130 The state legislatures vary widely in their “professionalism.”  Some legislatures meet
on a part-time basis, pay their members poorly, and provide few resources for staff; other
legislatures, most notably California’s, approach Congress in their professionalism. See gen-
erally Peverill Squire, Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited, 7
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 211 (2007) (describing legislative professionalism in detail and provid-
ing a metric with scores that indicate the professionalism of certain legislatures).
131 The states with year-round support for members are Nebraska, Missouri, Illinois,
and Tennessee; the states with session-only support are Iowa, Kansas, and Oklahoma.  No-
tice that both Arkansas and Kentucky do not provide any personal staff for members, con-
sistent with the notion that these two states have weakly professionalized legislatures,
meeting only biannually.  Recall that I exclude Arkansas and Kentucky from this analysis
for this reason.  For details on state legislative resources, see THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, supra note 27, at 109 tbl.3.21. R
132 For permissive delegations, I searched the text of each session law using the follow-
ing regular expression: “reasonabl|fair|public|may”.  This set of words is motivated by the
text from Judge Tatel’s American Trucking dissent. See supra note 122 and accompanying R
text.  I then normalize the number of matching strings by the number of words in the
session law.  For limiting appropriations riders, I employ the following regular expression:
“(no|none).{0,15}(fund|moneys).{0,50}(use|expend)”.
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words in the session law, though Illinois and Tennessee appear to
favor somewhat greater use of permissive language.
FIGURE 2. MISSOURI AND NEIGHBORING STATES (1990–2004)
Nebraska
Iowa
MissouriKansas
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Tennessee
Illinois
Kentucky
No Veto Veto Switcher
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS: LEGISLATIVE PRACTICES (1990–2004)
Missouri Kansas Illinois Iowa Nebraska Tennessee Oklahoma
Permissive Language 6.46 6.29 7.68 6.51 6.47 8.35 6.3
Limiting Riders 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.03
Defined Terms 0.46 2.68 1.24 1.16 0.03 0.93 1.2
Number of Words 3.98 3.47 4.55 2.23 4.03 0.81 3.21
Number of Session Laws 2738 3775 6828 3280 3237 8388 6442
Note: “Permissive Language” is the average number of occurrences of permissive language, normalized by the
number of words in the statute, in session laws that grant rulemaking authority to agencies; “Limiting Riders”
is the average number of riders in session laws that appropriate funds; “Defined Terms” is the average number
of defined terms, normalized by the number of words in the statute, in session laws that grant rulemaking
authority to agencies; the number of words is denominated in thousands, and represents the average over the
series. Note that I do not report figures for Arkansas and Kentucky, as those states have legislatures that
convene biannually.
In the Appendix, I use a standard difference-in-differences design
to estimate the effect of the legislative veto on Missouri legislative
drafting practices.133  Under this approach, we compare the differ-
ence in drafting practices in “control” states over the 1997 institu-
tional change to the difference in drafting practices in Missouri over
the 1997 institutional change.  Crucially, this approach allows us to
control both for time-invariant observable and unobservable
state-level characteristics, such as culture, and for time trends com-
133 See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND
PANEL DATA 147–51 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining the properties and assumptions related to
difference-in-differences estimates).
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mon to all states, such as economic or partisan cycles.  One may con-
ceive of the trends in drafting practices in the comparison states as
“counterfactuals” for Missouri’s drafting practices, had the state not
changed its veto device.  Missouri’s deviation from this counterfactual
trend represents the effect of the veto on drafting behavior.134
Here, I focus on graphical representations of the results, which
present the core aspects of the patterns.  I discuss the regression re-
sults only in passing, and I refer the reader to the Appendix for de-
tails.135  Consider first the permissiveness of the delegations passed by
the legislature in the aftermath of the loss of the veto.  To the extent
the legislature tightens delegations after the loss of the veto, we expect
to see a decrease in the use of permissive language following the
Missouri Coalition decision, at least relative to the “comparison group”
of states.  Recall that these comparison states provide a sense of how
the Missouri legislature might have behaved, had the state Supreme
Court not invalidated the veto.
FIGURE 3. VETO LOSS AND PERMISSIVE DELEGATIONS
134 Under this design, the critical identifying assumption is that, absent the introduc-
tion of the veto, states would have followed the same trends.  I allow the reader to visually
inspect the plausibility of this assumption in the figures below (Figures 3–7).  For these
figures, note that the trends of Missouri and the comparison states tend to roughly track
each other before the court decision and only thereafter diverge.
135 The regressions allow us to account for factors such as divided government, which
may powerfully condition our separation of powers arrangements. See Daryl J. Levinson &
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006)
(arguing that “the degree and kind of competition between the legislative and executive
branches vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the House,
Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 31 21-JUL-14 12:13
2014] UNITARY INNOVATIONS 1163
In Figure 3, I plot the average number of “permissive” words per
1,000 words of law in Missouri and the comparison states between
1990 and 2004.  Thus, a value of “7” indicates that the average law
passed during the relevant year contained seven permissive words per
1,000 words of statutory text.  As I noted above, for this exercise, I only
include session laws that explicitly involve the delegation of authority
to state administrative agencies.  The solid line represents the drafting
behavior of the Missouri legislature; the dashed line, the correspond-
ing behavior of the comparison states.  The dashed vertical line repre-
sents the last year before the Court invalidated the veto: years at or to
the left of the line reflect Missouri (and comparison state) behavior
before the loss of the veto; years to the right of the vertical line reflect
Missouri (and comparison state) behavior after the Missouri judicial
decision.136
The key to this figure is that, prior to the loss of the veto, Mis-
souri’s drafting behavior approximately tracked the behavior of the
comparison states.  The density of permissive words in delegations in-
creased and decreased from year to year but generally stayed around 7
permissive words per 1,000 words of law.  The behavior of the compar-
ison group did not change in a notable way in 1997 or afterward, con-
tinuing to hover around 7 permissive words per 1,000 words of law.
However, for Missouri, we note a marked decline in the density of
permissive words after the judicial decision.  This pattern indicates
that the Missouri legislature began drafting tighter statutes as a result
of the loss of the legislative veto.  Consistent with this figure, regres-
sion results reported in the Appendix indicate a decline of about 0.7
permissive words per 1,000 as a result of the loss of the veto; this result
is statistically significant.
Of course, less permissive statutes simply represent a more pre-
cise exercise of legitimate legislative power and, one may argue, do
not necessarily tread on executive prerogatives.137  So consider the use
of limiting riders, a form of legislative control that is similar in conse-
quence to a legislative veto, as highlighted by the state’s revised APA.
To the extent these tools behave as substitutes, we expect to see an
increase in the use of riders following the loss of the veto in Missouri
relative to the behavior of the comparison states.  Such behavior
would indicate that the Missouri legislature is simply swapping out
one tool of control, the veto, for another tool that is insulated from
judicial influence.
136 Notice that the judicial decision came down in January 1997, so I include laws
passed in 1997 in the post-veto regime.
137 Much as with appropriations riders, one might imagine arguments of certain forms
of specificity in legislation as being unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, see
Parnell, supra note 127, even if the argument is attenuated in this context. R
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I report the results related to this type of behavior in Figure 4,
which follows Figure 3 in formatting exactly.  Here, I examine the av-
erage number of limiting riders in statutes appropriating funds.
Thus, a figure of “0.2” means that, in that year, for Missouri (or the
comparison states), the average appropriations bill contained 0.2 ap-
propriations riders.  We might also examine the sum of riders in each
year for Missouri and the comparison states; the pattern is similar,
suggesting an increase in the total number of riders relative to com-
parison states in the aftermath of the veto loss.
FIGURE 4. VETO LOSS AND THE USE OF RIDERS
The key, again, to this figure is that prior to the judicial decision,
Missouri and the comparison states track each other in the use of rid-
ers.  Although Missouri is a less enthusiastic user of riders before the
decision, the figure suggests that Missouri and the comparison states
generally experience similar drafting pressures: in years when Mis-
souri writes in more riders, so do the comparison states; the difference
is that Missouri just starts from a somewhat lower level.  However, im-
mediately after the loss of the veto, the Missouri legislature increases
the use of riders and, in fact, begins to use them more commonly than
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the comparison states.  Following the decision, we see again Missouri
roughly tracking the comparison states; the difference, post-decision,
is that Missouri generally starts from a higher baseline than the com-
parison states.  The regression results reported in the Appendix sup-
port this figure, indicating that the legislature induced an increase in
the use of riders on the order of 0.08 per law containing appropria-
tions language.  For example, if we have 10 bills discussing appropria-
tions, the result indicates that the loss of the veto increased the
number of riders in the collection of bills by about one.138
Overall, then, the pattern is fairly clear.  The loss of the legislative
veto induced the Missouri legislature to adapt its drafting practices in
a number of predictable ways.  First, the state revised its APA, appar-
ently in direct response to the judicial decision.  Second, the state leg-
islature began using less permissive language when drafting
delegating statutes, suggestive of the legislature’s sensitivity to the loss
of the veto.  Third, consistent with this pattern and with the revision
of the state APA, the legislature increased the use of limiting appropri-
ations riders.  These activities, moreover, most likely represent an in-
complete set of legislative responses.  For example, we have no data
on state legislative oversight hearings, or on more informal contacts
between legislators and regulators, though it is reasonable to suppose
that the legislature also amplified these tools of control.  Thus, after
even an incomplete accounting, it is unclear whether Missouri Coali-
tion increased or decreased legislative interference in executive deci-
sion making.  The court removed one instrument of plural control,
but the legislature added several instruments back into the equation.
Therefore, the executive may have enjoyed more or less legislative in-
terference before the loss of the veto.
IV
VETO LOSS AND THE LOCUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
AND RESPONSIBILITY
Even if the legislature responds to the loss of the veto, a unitary
theorist may protest that these responses matter only at the margin—
the dominant consequence of the loss of the veto, one might suppose,
is the loss of the veto.  As such, despite legislative responses, the invali-
dation of the veto succeeds both in concentrating authority in the
hands of the executive and in making it “quite plain” that this is so.
The functionalist constitutional objective of simplifying lines of re-
sponsibility and promoting political accountability, in other words, is
138 The states do not identify their appropriations bills in a standard way, and so I cast
a wide net in identifying session laws with provisions for appropriations: I capture any
session law that mentions “appropriations.”  In total, I find approximately 8,400 appropria-
tions bills, or 560 per year, or about 80 per state per year.
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accomplished even as the legislature attempts to circumvent the judi-
cial decision.
One might counter this unitarian objection in two ways.  First,
one might argue that the sundry legislative responses compensated
for the judicial invalidation of the veto, such that legislative control
over regulatory affairs is unaffected or, perhaps, paradoxically en-
hanced as a result of the judicial decision.  Second, one might argue
that, even if the decision enhanced executive control over regulatory
affairs, the public did not increasingly associate the executive with reg-
ulatory policy, perhaps due to legislative sand throwing.  To the extent
that either of these points prevails, the unitarian ambition of facilitat-
ing political accountability is frustrated.  The main objective of this
Part is to assess the merits of this parry and counter-parry.
I focus on the first counter-parry, regarding legislative control
over regulatory affairs, though, as I explain below, in so doing I also
gesture toward the second counter-parry.  Plainly enough, no ready-
made metric of “control” over regulatory policy exists.  Earlier efforts
of addressing which branch controls the bureaucracy, therefore, have
studied whether agencies behave as if the Congress or the President
controlled them.  For example, in a seminal study, scholars examined
whether the types of cases considered by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion appeared responsive to changes in the composition of congres-
sional committees;139 other scholars have examined, for instance,
agencies’ spending patterns for evidence that they behave as if con-
trolled by congressional or presidential interests;140 still others till the
Unified Agenda and rulemaking behavior of federal agencies for signs
of behavior consistent with congressional or presidential control.141
These studies tend to exploit variation either in agency design (e.g.,
independent versus executive agencies) or in the composition of the
political branches (e.g., the majority party in Congress).
Surprisingly, scholars have devoted little attention to empirically
studying whether judicial decisions potentially alter the balance of
control over the bureaucracy, the subject of this Article.  Still, we
might imagine applying the above approaches to the present interest
in state-level judicial decisions.  Or we might conjure new tests: we
139 See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Con-
trol? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 766, 780
(1983).
140 See Christopher R. Berry et al., The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending,
104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783, 783 (2010); Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency
Spending and Political Control of the Bureaucracy 16–18 (2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/docu
ments/Berry%20Gersen%20Aug2010.pdf.
141 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 895–97 (2008).
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might examine, for example, campaign finance records, scrutinizing
the flow of money to the governor and legislature for signs of a shift in
influence following a judicial decision.  The central difficulty with all
of these approaches in the context of this Article is simple: we have no
relevant data.  For instance, the most comprehensive and widely used
database of state campaign finance records contains no entries for
Missouri gubernatorial elections prior to 1997.142  We thus seek a
source of data that is available historically at the state level and is in-
formative about legislative or executive control over the bureaucracy.
One source that fits this demanding bill is newspaper coverage.
An important and voluminous body of scholarship that has recently
emerged uses newspaper text to measure difficult-to-observe features
of our political system, often motivated by questions of politi-
cal accountability.143  For instance, scholars have recently used
newspaper reporting to assess the level of congressional achieve-
ment during a session;144 the size of the legislative agenda;145 the
ideology of Supreme Court justices;146 the level of public corrup-
142 The National Institute on Money in State Politics maintains a terrific database of
state campaign finance record. See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, http://www.
followthemoney.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).  However, these records only tend to start
in the late 1990s. See id.  Similarly, to my knowledge, no dataset approximating the Unified
Agenda or the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) exists at the state level.
143 For research focused on news and political accountability, see, for example, R.
DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS, THE PRESS, AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1–7 (2004) (ques-
tioning whether newspapers provide information necessary to hold public officials ac-
countable); Riccardo Puglisi & James M. Snyder, Jr., Newspaper Coverage of Political Scandals,
73 J. POL. 931, 931–34 (2011) (using newspaper text to study political scandals); James M.
Snyder Jr. & David Stro¨mberg, Press Coverage and Political Accountability, 118 J. POL. ECON.
355, 402–03 (2010) (showing the critical link between newspaper coverage and political
accountability in the context of congressional elections and behavior).  For other recent
research on the newspaper industry, see, for example, Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M.
Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35,
36–38 (2010) (using newspaper text to estimate the “slant” of various newspapers); Daniel
E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61
STAN. L. REV. 781, 785–87 (2009) (using newspaper editorials to estimate viewpoint diver-
sity in local media markets); Riccardo Puglisi & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Balanced U.S. Press
2–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17263, 2009) (using newspaper
endorsements of ballot propositions to estimate the location of newspapers, finding that
they tend to be centrists).
144 See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–1990 (1991) (using articles from the New York Times and Washington
Post to estimate Congress’s achievements).
145 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96, 93 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 519, 523–24 (1999) (using New York Times editorials to estimate the size of the
national legislative agenda).
146 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–60 (1989) (using newspaper editorials
to estimate the ideology of Supreme Court Justices). Cf. Edward H. Stiglitz, Appointment
Politics and the Ideological Composition of the Judiciary, 39 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 27, 34–36 (2014)
(using the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary to assess the ideology of judges on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals).
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tion;147 or the quality of candidates running for office.148  The chal-
lenge these scholars face is the same: they cannot directly observe
their outcome of interest.  Their intuition about a solution is also the
same: they examine the accounts of journalists, a highly educated
group that observes and records events at a very local level, to glean
insights into their particular interest.149  So here, I examine the ac-
counts of state-level journalists, a group of “oddly informed” peo-
ple,150 for their perceptions of control over administrative agencies.
Thus, instead of examining whether agencies behave as if controlled
by the legislature or the executive, I examine the recorded thoughts
on control over agencies of a class of professional observers.  It is rea-
sonable to suppose that if reporters view the executive as central to
administration, they will write about the executive and the administra-
tion; and just the same for the legislature.
Though it is not my focus, a benefit of this approach is that it also
touches upon the question of public or mass perceptions about con-
trol over the administrative state.151  A large literature connects media
coverage with political accountability, viewing newspapers as a vehicle
for informing voters of public affairs.152  Building off this robust litera-
ture,153 others have also recognized the relevance of newspaper cover-
age in this sense with respect to accountability for regulatory actions
147 See, e.g., Elena Costas-Pe´rez et al., Corruption Scandals, Voter Information, and Account-
ability, 28 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 469, 470–71 (2012) (using newspaper accounts to measure the
incidence of public corruption); Abby K. Wood, Bounty Hunting: The Limits of Financial
Incentives for Reporting Corruption 14 (Feb. 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884727 (same). Cf. Richard T.
Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Measuring Public Corruption in the American States: A Survey of State
House Reporters, 3 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 420, 422–29 (2003) (surveying state reporters for
their perceptions of corruption in state government).
148 See, e.g., Shigeo Hirano & James M. Snyder, Jr., Primary Elections and the Quality of
Elected Officials 19–23 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
vanderbilt.edu/csdi/events/Hirano.Talk.pdf (using newspaper editorials to measure the
quality of candidates for elected office).
149 WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 41 (1922) (“The unseen environment is re-
ported to us chiefly by words.”).
150 I thank Adam Samaha for this turn of phrase.
151 Of course, I do not show that ordinary citizens actually consume these accounts,
much less that these accounts influence citizens’ views, in that they cut through the fog of
indifference and the din of other information sources available to citizens, or that these
views translate to voting behavior.  For this reason, the first interpretation of news ac-
counts—as informative of the fact of control—is the preferred interpretation for the pur-
poses of this Article.
152 See, e.g., supra note 143; Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Presidency and the Mass Media, in THE R
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 254, 254 (George C. Edwards III &
William G. Howell eds., 2009) (reviewing the relevant literature in political science and
noting that “[c]itizens use information from the news to hold government leaders account-
able for their actions in office”).
153 See, e.g., supra note 143. R
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in particular.154  One set of studies examines newspaper attributions
of responsibility in the context of the Deepwater Horizon- or Katrina-
related administrative failures.155  More relevant still to the unitary ex-
ecutive debates, another recent study, for example, probed the extent
to which newspapers discussed Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) interventions into the rulemaking process, with an eye
to political accountability.156  Another closely related and productive
line of research focuses on agency design, examining variation in
newspaper coverage of the President in relation to agencies over
which the President has more or less formal control.157  There, the
motivation is to study whether newspapers attribute presidential re-
sponsibility more in the former than in the latter, and whether these
news accounts influence readers’ views, generally concluding in affir-
mances on both questions.  Together, this suggests that the media fa-
cilitates accountability by leading the public to regard the president as
(more) responsible for actions he (more fully) controls. Though, to
my knowledge, none of these studies considers judicial decisions or
154 Of course, political accountability in this context also refers to elected actors either
in Congress or the White House.  An insight of the research in this paragraph is to focus
on accountability for policies or outcomes created more directly by bureaucratic actors,
rather than, say, economic performance generally, which cannot be easily connected with
any particular regulatory action.
155 See Thomas Birkland & Sarah Waterman, Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in
Hurricane Katrina?, 38 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 692, 701–05 (2008) (studying newspaper at-
tributions of responsibility to the government for responses to Hurricane Katrina); Travis
M. Johnston & Stephen N. Goggin, Presidential Confidence in Crisis: Blame, Media, and
the BP Oil Spill 24–31 (Sept. 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
ocf.berkeley.edu/~tmjohnst/johnston_and_goggin-bp_paper.pdf (demonstrating the con-
nection between media coverage and the attribution of blame to Obama in the context of
the BP oil spill). Cf. Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public’s
Response to Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 120, 122 (2008) (using a survey experiment to study
attributions of responsibility to the government for Katrina and emphasizing that “Ameri-
cans across the country . . . are likely to have been exposed to news coverage of the
storm”).
156 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 14, at 79 (using a survey of agency officials to R
study the media’s attribution of OIRA influence over rulemaking).
157 For research examining newspaper coverage of independent and executive agen-
cies at the federal level, see Ruder, supra note 16, at 2 (studying “how mass media enables R
political accountability over agencies,” using newspaper text to study attributions of re-
sponsibility for actions of executive and independent agencies, and finding more presiden-
tial attributions for executive agencies); Alex Ruder, Institutional Design and the
Attribution of Presidential Control: Insulating the President From Blame 26 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~aruder/insulation_paper.pdf (focus-
ing on the framing of news articles featuring executive and independent agencies,
“show[ing] that news coverage generally reflects presidential power”).  These indepen-
dently conceived efforts thus bear on bureaucratic accountability but examine static institu-
tional environments, studying how the media acts as a mechanism of information
transmission.  By comparison, my main interest is in using newspaper text as plausible in-
dicators of elite perceptions of changing authority in response to judicial decisions.
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interbranch dynamics,158 all of these studies, among others,159 sup-
port the plausible notion that studying newspaper coverage allows a
trace on mass perceptions.
Thus, examining newspaper coverage most directly provides an
indication of who controls the bureaucracy.  At a foundational level, a
unitary theorist posits that a unitary judicial decision produces more
unitary control over executive functions, widely viewed to include reg-
ulatory actions.160  The views of state-level reporters provide insight on
this proposition.  More indirectly, this approach provides insight into
the associations between administration, the executive, and the legis-
lature that ordinary citizens were considering over the period. In both
of these senses, newspaper coverage informs the validity of the unitary
and dynamic perspectives articulated above.  I am able to construct a
series of historical newspaper articles dating to 1990 for Illinois, Kan-
sas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.161
Taking a cue from the literature on media information provision
and political accountability, I identify the implicit perceptions of con-
trol contained in a newspaper article through a simple metric.162  For
this measure, I simply examine the proportion of references to the
158 I am aware of one other recent paper that examines shifts in newspaper coverage
resulting from judicial decisions, but this paper focuses on abortion decisions rather than
regulatory events.  Daniel L. Chen et al., Do Policies Affect Preferences?  Evidence from
Random Variation in Abortion Jurisprudence (Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
159 See supra notes 155–56. R
160 Again, recall then-Judge Kennedy’s opinion in Chadha, regarding the legislative
veto as interfering with the “central functions” of the executive branch.
161 In particular, I use Westlaw’s state newspaper databases to recover historical articles
based on the search string: “(governor legislature) & (regulation rulemaking) & (agency
department bureau commission) & da(aft 1990 & bef 2005) % (clinton bush)”.  Note that
the last term in this string is designed to filter out articles containing references to “Gover-
nor Clinton” and “Governor Bush,” both of whom ran for president during the period in
question.  I recover a total of approximately 8,000 articles.  I then drop any article in which
2/3 or more of the references to states are to states other than the state of publication; this
serves to eliminate stories in state X that discuss events in state Y.  Notice that not all states
neighboring Missouri had newspaper archives dating to the early 1990s; the databases for
Iowa and Nebraska, for instance, begin only in late 1996, and thus provide almost no in-
sight into the coverage in these states prior to the relevant judicial decision in Missouri.
162 See, e.g., Snyder & Stro¨mberg, supra note 143 (examining mentions of House repre- R
sentatives in newspaper text); Arnold, supra note 143 (same); Cohen, supra note 152 (same R
with respect to references to the president); Ruder, supra note 16 (same in the context of R
stories about independent and executive agencies); Birkland & Waterman, supra note 155 R
(examining mentions of various institutions in news reporting on Katrina).  To my knowl-
edge, others have not used such references to infer control over particular organs of gov-
ernment, particularly in the inter-branch balancing context considered in this Article. But
on this last point, see Cohen, supra note 152, at 256, who examines two series, one consist- R
ing of the proportion of front-page New York Times stories referring to the president, and
the other consisting of the corresponding proportion for Congress.  His data show that
congressional news stories dominate the front page (relative to presidential stories) in the
second half of the nineteenth century, and that the two series essentially converge in the
early 1900s.
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executive among all political branch references in each article.163
This metric, therefore, gives a raw sense of the frequency with which
newspapers discuss the executive vis-a`-vis the legislature.
The operative question is whether this metric increased or de-
creased in response to Missouri Coalition.  Under the straightforward
unitary theory, we might expect to see the simple metric increase, re-
flecting greater executive control over administrative actions.  By con-
trast, under the alternative, rebalancing theory,164 one might expect
no change in the metric, or perhaps even a decrease, suggesting
greater legislative control over administrative actions.
I again assess this question through a difference-in-differences ap-
proach, this time using the proportion of executive references as the
dependent variable.  Also, as in the previous Part, I focus on graphical
representations of the results in the main text, and I report the corre-
sponding regression results in the Appendix.
In Figure 5, I present the results related to this metric, using this
Article’s now familiar formatting.  The figure follows, in approximate
terms, the following pattern: before the loss of the veto, newspaper
accounts in Missouri and neighboring states contain roughly equal
proportions of references to the governor; after the loss of the veto,
the proportion of references to the governor decreases in Missouri
relative to the proportion in newspapers in nearby states.  For in-
stance, prior to the judicial decision, Missouri had a higher propor-
tion of references to the executive than neighboring states in three
163 For references to the executive, I search for “governor” or “gov.”; for references to
the legislature, I search for “legislature” or “assembly.” I restrict attention to such refer-
ences occurring within 100 words of a reference to an administrative agency.  The purpose
of considering only words in the region of a reference to an agency is to focus on the
language most likely to refer to agencies.  For this exercise, I drop any article that does not
contain at least one political branch reference in the relevant window of text (the
incidence of such dropped articles is not correlated with the loss of the veto).  I also con-
duct a simple validation exercise, tasking Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to respond to
the following prompt for 400 randomly selected articles (excerpted in the same fashion as
used for the metric): “The newspaper article excerpted below refers to a state government
agency, such as a state Department of Education or a state Department of Agriculture.
Based on the article, who do you think is most responsible for the actions of the agency:
the state governor or the state legislature? or is it unclear?”  The respondents then have the
option of selecting “Governor”, “Legislature”, or “Unclear.”  This “most responsible” lan-
guage is adapted to the state administrative context from commonly used language in re-
lated studies of the federal government. See, e.g., Brad T. Gomez & J. Matthew Wilson,
Political Sophistication and Attributions of Blame in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 38 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 633 (2008); Malhotra & Kuo, supra note 157.  The results from this exercise R
support the metric.  The proportion of political branch references to the executive corre-
sponds in a sensible way to the workers’ judgments about the content of the article: the
mean proportion increases from 0.30 for articles in which workers respond “Legislature,”
to 0.60 for articles in which workers respond “Unclear,” to 0.84 for articles in which work-
ers respond “Governor.”  The difference between each of these means is significant at any
conventional level.
164 See supra Part III.
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years (1991, 1992, 1995), and the neighboring states had a higher pro-
portion of references to the executive than Missouri in three years
(1993, 1994, 1996).  Following the judicial decision, Missouri had a
higher proportion of such references in only one of eight years in the
sample.165  The corresponding regression results indicate that, on av-
erage, the loss of the veto decreased the relative prevalence of politi-
cal branch references to the governor by about 0.08 units.  This gap
between the comparison states and Missouri indicates that the veto
attenuated the connection, as implied by newspaper accounts, be-
tween executive and administrative actions.  That is, had the judiciary
not eliminated the veto, we might have expected newspapers’ implicit
perceptions of executive control to increase in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, as it did in neighboring states.
FIGURE 5. IMPLICIT PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL
We can further interrogate the data by examining newspaper arti-
cles for evidence of changes in references to the tools of legislative
165 Given that we examine a small number of states, caution is warranted when at-
tempting to draw inferences from any year in particular (e.g., the flip in 1999).
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influence.  For example, as the legislature responds to the judicial de-
cision, do newspapers discuss matters related to appropriations more
frequently?  Similarly, do we see changes in the frequency of refer-
ences to hearings before legislative committees?  An increase in refer-
ences to such tools of legislative influence substantiates a connection
between changes in legislative behavior supposedly precipitated by the
judicial decision and changes in the public’s sense, as reported in
newspapers, of responsibility for regulatory affairs.  On the other
hand, failing to find such a pattern would question the interpretation
of the results in Figure 5.
In Figures 6 and 7, I examine the number of references to appro-
priations and hearings, respectively, using the same format as for the
preceding figures.166  In Figure 6, we see that Missouri newspapers
became much more interested in discussing appropriations, relative
to the comparison states, in the aftermath of the judicial decision in-
validating the legislative veto.  This suggests a connection between the
legislature exercising its power of the purse and control over adminis-
trative agencies.  Although this exercise does not focus on limiting rid-
ers, this pattern is consistent with the main findings of this Part.  As
administrative agencies increasingly operated in the shadow of possi-
ble riders, we might expect this change to manifest in a more general
concern about appropriations and regulatory affairs.  Of particular
note is the fact that the apex of newspaper stories about appropria-
tions, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, is also the apex of the legisla-
ture’s use of appropriations riders.
A related series appears in Figure 7, where I focus on references
to legislative oversight hearings in stories about regulatory affairs.167
The formatting of the figure follows the standard approach of this
Article.  This series, likewise, tends to confirm our views about
changes in legislative behavior leading to a shift toward perceptions of
legislative control, at least relative to the course taken by neighboring
states.  The series, in other words, provides a plausible link between
the mechanism of legislative control and the sense of administrative
responsibility implicit in reporters’ writing.
166 Notice that this exercise follows the spirit of Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note
14, at 79, though obviously focused on tools of congressional influence rather than of
presidential influence. As in Figure 5, I limit attention to language appearing within 100
words of a reference to an administrative agency.
167 I identify such hearings using the following regular expression: ‘(assembly|house|
senate|legislative|legislature|committee).{0,200}hearings?|hearings?.{0,200}(assembly|
house|senate|legislative|legislature|committee)’. This regular expression seeks out a refer-
ence to the legislatures followed in short order by a reference to a hearing; or, conversely,
a reference to a hearing followed in short order by a reference to the legislature.
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FIGURE 6. NEWSPAPER REFERENCES TO APPROPRIATIONS
FIGURE 7. NEWSPAPER REFERENCES TO HEARINGS
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What does all this add up to?  The most straightforward story is
the following: injured by the loss of the legislative veto, the legislature
turned to alternative, constitutionally valid mechanisms of control
over administrative agencies.  These alternative devices, in fact,
proved quite effective at controlling administrative agencies.  The evi-
dence of implicit perceptions of control from newspaper accounts, in-
deed, suggests that legislative control was enhanced from where it
would have been had the court not invalidated the legislative veto.
Moreover, the newspaper accounts provide linkages between the
mechanisms of legislative control—appropriations and hearings, for
example—and evidence of implicit perceptions of control.
However, it is also worth considering an alternative account, in
which the legislative responses exert little control over agencies.
Under this view, the newspaper accounts reflect the minutes of per-
haps less-than-gimlet-eyed journalists who mechanically record events
as they transpire.  An increase in newspaper attributions of legislative
control, therefore, simply means a more active legislature, not, in fact,
a legislature with greater control over agencies.  It is not possible to
entirely rule out this possibility at present, at least in the context of
this natural experiment; though it is important to note that much
prior research supports the idea that agencies exhibit great sensitivity
to both their funding levels and to legislative hearings, for example.168
It is also worth noting that, even under this alternative account, the
unitary objective of it being “quite plain who should be punished” re-
mains unmet, seemingly frustrated by the legislative response and
poor newspaper reporting.169  The more straightforward story though
is that agencies care about budgets (for example) and respond when
the legislature threatens to withhold funding, leading to the conse-
quences for political accountability set forth above.170
168 On appropriations, see, for example, Beermann, supra note 25, at 85–89 (discuss- R
ing the power of the purse); Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency
Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 602 (1989) (noting that appropriations give an agency
“an incentive to shade its policy choice toward the legislature’s [preferred policy] to take
advantage of that inducement”); Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional
Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766 (2010) (arguing that
limiting riders provide leverage over agencies and providing some empirical evidence to
this effect); Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications for Bureaucratic
Policy-Making, 106 PUB. CHOICE 243 (2001) (studying theoretically the ability of the legisla-
ture to control agency actions through budgeting).  On hearings, see, for example,
Beermann, supra note 25, at 85–89 (discussing various purposes of hearings); J.R. DeShazo R
& Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1516 (2003) (noting that oversight committees “have enormous influence and can
steer agencies away from their statutory obligations”).
169 WILSON, supra note 1, 186–87.  As indicated above, this quote is particularly note- R
worthy because Justice Stevens used it to motivate, in part, his concurrence in Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 738 n.1 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
170 I thank Matthew Stephenson for suggesting the complication of this paragraph. On
this final point, however, notice that this is also the story that most worries some propo-
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V
A TENTATIVE FEDERAL ASSESSMENT
Most of this Article has focused on the states in an effort to draw
more rigorous empirical inferences.  Although we cannot reach as
firm conclusions using data from the federal government—again, for
the simple reason that we have no natural comparison government—
it is of interest to cast our eyes on Congress and the President, even if
our assessment remains necessarily speculative.
The modern wave of doctrinal innovations ostensibly promoting
a unitary executive began in earnest in the mid-1970s.171  Starting with
Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, wherein the Court invalidated a congressional
scheme to appoint members to an administrative body,172 and contin-
uing for the next decade, the Court hemmed Congress’s ability to in-
fluence administrative agencies in various ways.173 Chadha then
followed in 1983, invalidating the legislative veto.174  Shortly after, in
Bowsher v. Synar, the Court restricted officials under the control of
Congress from performing “executive” duties.175  A few years later, the
courts invalidated an effort by Congress to “pre-select” allowable can-
didates for appointment to administrative agencies.176  This trend in
constitutional interpretation, to a large extent, coincided with a move
by the Court to loosen constraints placed on the Executive by adminis-
trative law.  The landmark Chevron decision, which endows agencies
with a great deal of discretion when interpreting statutes, came down
in 1984.177  Just a year later, the Court clarified that, within a wide
zone, agencies had discretion not to enforce statutory provisions.178
nents of a unitary executive. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 51–54 (arguing that the tools of R
appropriations and hearings render legislative committees as “rival executives”).
171 An earlier set of cases promoting similar values, of course, also exists. See, e.g.,
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926).
172 See 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976).
173 As noted above, this was not of course an entirely uniform trend. See, e.g., Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (approving an independent counsel, though appointed by a
federal court and removable by the Attorney General only with good cause).
174 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
175 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986) (noting that although Congress determines the nature
of executive duty through legislation, once “Congress makes its choice in enacting legisla-
tion, its participation ends”).
176 See Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that Congress may not require appointments to Board of Directors of Airport
Authority be made from lists supplied by the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate).
177 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
178 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985) (holding agency decisions not
to initiate enforcement proceedings presumptively unreviewable).
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Though the trend between the mid-1970s and the next fifteen
years or so is not entirely uniform,179 the general trend nevertheless
exists.  During this period, on both interpretative and constitutional
fronts, the courts endowed the executive with assurances of indepen-
dence from congressional meddling.  This, at least, is the narrative
that emerges from the text of these important decisions.
Yet the forgoing compels us to question whether, in response to
these doctrinal affronts, members of Congress sat idly as the Court
attempted to limit the scope and method of congressional control
over the administrative state.  On this score we cannot reach firm con-
clusions.  It is not possible, in a general or rigorous way, to say
whether, for example, Congress held more aggressive hearings as a
result of the judicial decisions.  For instance, during this same period
of doctrinal innovation, the administrative state was growing rapidly, a
fact that plausibly induced Congress to amplify the number of hear-
ings independent of the Court’s decisions.180  Or the composition of
interest groups lobbying for or against hearings may have changed.
Such considerations confound any firm conclusions.  Still, we can
reach some tentative assessments.
Consider, for instance, the number of congressional hearings
dealing with agency rulemakings.181  In the left panel of Figure 8, I
plot the number of congressional hearings that discuss agency
rulemaking efforts in each year between 1975 and 1990, a central pe-
riod in the rise of the unitary executive doctrine, as noted by the judi-
cial decision timeline on the bottom of the figure.  Aside from the
quite evident periodicity in the number of congressional hearings—
the number of hearings drops by about 20% during election
years182—no dominant pattern emerges from this left panel.  How-
ever, this left panel reflects raw counts of hearings and is therefore
subject to the criticisms of the previous paragraph.  As a simple rem-
edy for some of these criticisms, in the right panel I normalize the
179 For instance, the Court arguably tightened arbitrariness review in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
180 See JOHN MARINI, THE POLITICS OF BUDGET CONTROL: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY,
AND THE GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 11–13 (1992).
181 For this exercise, I consider all published hearings between 1975 and 1990 and
identify any hearing that explicitly discusses “rulemaking.”  The hearing publication gener-
ally includes witness statements, transcripts of questions and answers, exhibits submitted by
witnesses, and correspondence submitted by interested parties.  I derive the data for this
exercise from ProQuest Congressional, which contains an excellent collection of historical
congressional documents.  Notice that I include both House and Senate hearings in this
exercise.
182 Between 1975 and 1990, the average number of hearings during odd years is 537;
the corresponding figure for even years is 425.  The most straightforward interpretation of
this decline in hearings during election years is that members spend much of the year
campaigning.
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number of hearings by the number of rules finalized in each year.183
Here, we see that the number of hearings per finalized rule increases
fairly steadily throughout the period considered: in 1975, Congress
held about one hearing for every four finalized rules; by 1990, Con-
gress held about three hearings for every four finalized rules.184
Again, we can only regard these patterns as suggestive.  All the same,
the suggestion is clear: Congress responded to the judicial decisions of
the period by increasing oversight on regulatory matters.
FIGURE 8. DOCTRINAL INNOVATIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
We can also probe, again in a suggestive way, whether these doc-
trinal changes induced changes in journalists’ implicit perceptions of
which branch controls the bureaucracy.  To consider this possibility, I
183 I determine the number of rules finalized in each year by conducting searches on
Westlaw’s old Federal Register database.
184 One interesting fact is that, contrary to popular lore, the number of regulations
issued by federal agencies has not been steadily increasing for all time.  The number of
finalized rules was actually considerably higher in the early 1970s than in the 1990s.  This
pattern reflects the novel safety and environmental programs taking flight in the early
1970s, activity that waned as the regulatory programs matured and, arguably, judicial scru-
tiny “ossified” agency rulemaking. But see Edward H. Stiglitz, The Reformation of Adminis-
tration Law and Agency Ossification 18–25 (Sept. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (finding that judicial scrutiny had a limited role in producing agency
ossification).
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examine approximately 5,000 New York Times articles published be-
tween 1980 and 1990 that discuss regulatory actions or events.185  Af-
ter collecting such articles, I then determine, using the simple metric
of the proportion of political branch references to the executive ap-
plied in Part IV, whether the article posits executive or legislative con-
trol over the regulation.  The steady stream of Supreme Court cases
endowing the executive with administrative authority suggests that we
should see a drift toward a discussion of the executive in news ac-
counts.  However, the fact that Congress appears to amplify its admin-
istrative controls during this same period suggests that we might see
no change in implicit perceptions of control, or perhaps even a shift
toward the legislature.
In Figure 9, I plot the average score between 1980 and 1990 for
articles appearing in the New York Times.  As in the context of state-
based application, higher values indicate a closer connection between
the executive and the regulatory action (i.e., a higher proportion of
references to the executive); lower values, by contrast, suggest a closer
connection between the legislature and the regulatory action (i.e., a
higher proportion of references to the legislature).  Based on this
metric, we see no notable increase in implicit perceptions of executive
control.  Instead, throughout the period, the dominant theme is one
of shared responsibility.  After a decline in the early 1980s, the average
article hovers around 0.5,186 suggesting that, at least in the eyes of New
York Times reporters, neither the President nor Congress dominated
the administration during the period—these reporters made about
equal reference to the President and to Congress in articles discussing
regulatory affairs.
Though this exercise is only suggestive for the reasons indicated
above, the results are nevertheless consistent with the perspective of
this Article.  Despite the wave of judicial decisions from Chevron to
Bowsher endowing the Executive with greater control over the adminis-
trative state, we see little evidence of elite observers perceiving a closer
connection between administrative actions and executive responsibil-
ity.  This, at least, is the story that emerges from newspaper coverage.
This pattern plausibly reflects the fact that Congress “rebalanced” dur-
ing this same period of doctrinal innovation, amplifying congressional
hearing activity.  Thus, the Court may have changed congressional be-
185 I search Lexis’s newspaper archives for New York Times articles that mention (a) the
“president” or “Congress”; (b) an “agency”, “commission”, “bureau”, or “department”; and
(c) a “regulation” or “rulemaking”; and that appear under the heading of the National
Desk of the Times. This search recovers approximately 4,800 articles between 1980 and
1990.  The series begins in 1980 because that is when Lexis began archiving full-text ver-
sions of New York Times articles; ideally, the series would begin during the 1970s.
186 Notice that the shaded region around the dashed line represents the 95% confi-
dence interval around year averages.
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havior, but it is not at all clear that it ended up producing more “uni-
tary” control over administrative functions.
FIGURE 9. NEW YORK TIMES IMPLICIT PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As one scholar observed, perhaps the most notable feature of our
Constitution is its “silences”—the fact that “it says little about how
those it names as necessary elements of government . . . will perform
their functions, and it says almost nothing at all about [ ] unelected
officials.”187  Amidst these silences, constitutional values and princi-
ples help resolve disputes over the republic’s proper structure.
Here, I focus on the central constitutional value of political ac-
countability.  This value motivates much of the unitary executive doc-
trine in stripping away instruments of congressional control over the
bureaucracy.  Concentrating authority in the executive, runs the the-
ory, promotes the constitutional value of political accountability.188
However attractive in theory, the connection between the judicial de-
187 Strauss, supra note 48, at 597. R
188 See supra Part II.A.
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cisions promoting a unitary executive and political accountability is
not as straightforward as some unitary proponents suggest.  Indeed,
the empirical pattern in this Article indicates that judicially imposed
unitary innovations may, in fact, invite plural control of agencies,
plausibly attenuating political accountability.
The idea is simple.  Congress invented the legislative veto as a
response to the growth of the administrative state.  Even as the Court
invalidated the veto, the administrative state, and Congress’s funda-
mental unease, remained.  The loss of the veto led the legislature to
adopt a host of alternative controls.189  These substitute forms of con-
trol plausibly interfered with executive discretion to an even greater
degree than the veto itself.  As a consequence, the Court’s unitary in-
novation invited more, not less, plurality in the authorship of adminis-
trative actions, plausibly amplifying congressional control over
agencies.  A study of Missouri’s experience with the judicially imposed
loss of the legislative veto supports both propositions: the legislature
turned to other methods of bureaucratic control, and, judged by
newspaper content, the public did not end up with a bureaucracy
more unambiguously dominated by the executive.  In this way, the
unitary innovation seemingly undermined the functionalist constitu-
tional values it sought to promote.
Hamilton’s proposition is not necessarily wrong.  The difficulty,
instead, is that scholars and jurists take the proposition as a complete
theory rather than as just part of a theory.  Given that Congress will
always have tools to interfere with executive powers, the relevant func-
tionalist question is not whether a specific institutional device, ceteris
paribus, hampers the exercise of executive powers.  The question, in-
stead, is whether the institutional device under consideration is pref-
erable to substitute devices that Congress is likely to take up.
Sometimes we will prefer to have Congress use other devices; or per-
haps we view it as unlikely that Congress will take up an alternative
device.  Other times, however, the substitutes prove less appealing—
from a functionalist view or, if we root the formalist view in the foun-
ders’ values, a formalist view—than the initial device.190  This appears
to be the case with the legislative veto.
189 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. R
190 Of course, in this sense this Article has merely raised the question rather than
resolved it.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 50 21-JUL-14 12:13
1182 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1133
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A. Regression Results
In this subpart of the Appendix, I explain and report regression
results related to Parts III and IV of the main text.  I organize this
subpart of the Appendix to reflect the organization of the main text.
1. Veto Loss and Institutional Responses
For this section, I estimate the following difference-in-difference
regression:
dst = as + gt + bvetost + est(1)
where dst is an outcome related to drafting behavior; as is a state spe-
cific intercept; gt is a period (i.e., year) specific intercept; and vetost is
an indicator that takes “1” if state s has the legislative veto in period t
and a “0” otherwise.191  Notice that the state and period intercepts
allow us to account for unobserved state and time characteristics, re-
spectively.  Our interest, though, is in the b coefficient, which provides
the estimate of the effect of the legislative veto on drafting behavior.
Recall that I consider two main legislative responses: (1) changes in
the permissiveness of delegations and (2) changes in the use of limit-
ing appropriations riders.
I report the results relating to these regressions in Table A1.  The
first column of the table reports the results for the permissiveness met-
ric; the third column, the results for appropriations riders.  Focus first
on the permissiveness results.  There, we see that the loss of the legis-
lative veto decreased the average number of permissive words per
1,000 words in delegating statutes by about 0.69 units.  In other words,
relative to comparison states, Missouri passed considerably more per-
missive statutes prior to the loss of the veto.  Recall that the average
number of such permissive words per 1,000 is about 7, so the magni-
tude of the coefficient is substantively significant.  The third column
indicates that the loss of the veto induced the legislature to increase
the use of appropriations riders.  That is, relative to comparison states,
Missouri’s legislature included fewer appropriations riders prior to
the loss of the veto.  The average appropriations bill contains about
0.8 riders, so again the magnitude of the coefficient is substantively
significant.  In both cases, the coefficient is statistically significant.192
191 Data on legislative vetoes comes primarily from various editions of The Book of the
States.  I supplement and corroborate the data from The Book of the States  using various
state-level publications.  For example, Dean, supra note 102, at 1161–66, provides an excel- R
lent history of the veto in Missouri.
192 For all models discussed in this Appendix, I report standard errors below the coeffi-
cients in parentheses.  I account for within-state dependence in the data by calculating wild
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As a robustness exercise, we can further include covariates in the
regression to control for possible factors that might influence legisla-
tive practices.  Here, I consider the following covariates: divided gov-
ernment, log population, log real personal income, and the
unemployment rate.  The second and fourth columns of Table A1 re-
port the results for permissiveness and riders, respectively, once we
include this set of political and economic covariates.  The result on
the legislative veto does not appear sensitive to the inclusion of these
covariates.
TABLE A1. VETO LOSS AND LEGISLATIVE PRACTICES
Permissiveness Appropriations Riders
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Veto 0.69 0.63 -0.08 -0.09
(0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Political Covariates N Y N Y
N 5910 5910 8431 8431
R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
Note: Wild cluster bootstrap standard errors, with states as groups, reported in parentheses
(400 pseudo samples).  “Permissiveness” is number of occurrences of “reasonabl”, “fair”,
“may”, or “public” per 1,000 words of statutory text; for this dependent variable, regression
run on subset of session laws that both mention the promulgation of rules and an agency.
See Part III for the definition of a “rider” and for my approach to detecting such provi-
sions; for this dependent variable, regression run on the subset of session laws that discuss
appropriations.  Political covariates consist of: divided government indicator, log popula-
tion, log personal income, and the unemployment rate.
2. Veto Loss and the Locus of Administrative Control and
Responsibility
The specification I consider in this section is identical to the spec-
ification in the previous section.  The only difference is that we con-
sider different data: news coverage instead of legislative drafting
practices.  I discuss the regression results in the order presented in the
main text.  All results appear in Table A2.
The main results, reported in the first column, indicate that the
loss of the veto shifted the proportion of executive branch references
among all political branch references toward the legislature rather than
the executive.193  That is, the loss of the veto reduced the relative prev-
alence of references to the executive in newspapers.  The relative
cluster bootstrap standard errors. See A. Colin Cameron et al., Bootstrap-Based Improvements
for Inference with Clustered Errors, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 414, 417–18 (2008).
193 For references to the executive, I consider: “governor” or “gov.”; for references to
the legislature, I consider: “assembly” or “legislature”.  I focus on such references within
100 words of a reference to an administrative agency.
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prevalence of executive branch references, in particular, decreased by
about 0.07 units as a result of the loss of the veto; this result is statisti-
cally significant.  The third column indicates that the loss of the veto
increased the average number of references in newspaper articles to
appropriations by about 0.4 units; and the fifth column indicates that
the judicial decision ended up also increasing references to oversight
hearings in newspaper articles by about 0.03 units; both of these mod-
els return with statistically significant coefficients on veto loss.
As in Table A1, we can also account for the following covariates:
divided government, log population, log real personal income, and
the unemployment rate.  The results with respect to the effect of the
legislative veto do not appear sensitive to these covariates, as reported
in the second, fourth, and sixth columns of the table.
TABLE A2. LEGISLATIVE VETO AND REGULATORY NEWS COVERAGE
Raw Political
Branch References Appropriations Oversight Hearings
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Veto 0.07 0.08 -0.4 -0.38 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Political Covariates N Y N Y N Y
N 5224 5224 7568 7568 7568 7568
R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Note: Wild cluster bootstrap standard errors, with states as groups, reported in parentheses
(400 pseudo samples).  “Raw Political Branch References” is the number of references to
the governor in the article divided by the total number of political branch references in
the article (executive or legislative); “Appropriations” is the number of references to ap-
propriations in the article; “Hearings” is the number of references to oversight hearings in
the article.  Political covariates consist of: divided government indicator, log population,
log personal income, and the unemployment rate.  The number of observations for mod-
els 1 and 2 is reduced due to the fact that not all articles feature a political branch refer-
ence within 100 words of a reference to an administrative agency.
